Linear logic  by Girard, Jean-Yves
Theoretical Computer Science 50 (1987) l-102 
North-Holland 
Jean-Yves GI IXD 
gquipe de Logique Mathknatique, UA 753 du CNRS, UER de Mathkmatiques, Universite’ de Paris 
VII, 75251 Paris, France 
Communicated by M. Nivat 
Received October 1986 
A la mbmoive de Jean van Heijenoort 
Abstract. The familiar connective of negation is broken into two operations: linear negation which 
is the purely negative part of negation and the modality “of course” which has the meaning of 
a reaffirmation. Following this basic discovery, a completely new approach to the whole area 
between constructive logics and programmation is initiated. 
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Linear logic is a logic behind logic, more precisely, it provides a continuation of 
the constructivization that began Jvith intuitionistic logic. The logic is as strong as 
the usual ones, i.e., intuitionistic logic can be translated into linear logic in a faithful 
ic shows that the constructive features of intuitionistic operations 
o the linear aspects of some intuitionistic connectives o antifiers, 
se lirii%i feZiUn’eS are has two 
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semantics: 
(i) a Tarskian semantics, the phase semantics, based on the idea that truth makes 
an angle with reality; this ‘angle’ is called a phase, and the connectives are developed 
according to those operations that are of immediate interest in terms of phases. 
eytingian semantics, the coherent semantics, which is just a cleaning of 
fcqiliar Scott semantics for intuitionistic operations, followed by the decomposition 
of the obtained operations into more primitive ones. 
The connectives obtained are 
- the multiplicatives (@,78, -+) which are bilinear versions of “and”, “or”, 
“implies”; 
- the additives (C&&z) which are linear versions of “or”, “and”; 
_ the exponentials ( !, ?) which have some similarity with the moda4s Cl and 0 and 
which are essential to preserve the logical strength. 
All these connectives are dominated by the hnear negation (.)I, which is a 
constructive and involutive negation; by the way, linear logic works in a classical 
framework, while being more constructive than intuitionistic logic. The phase seman- 
tics is complete w.r.t. linear sequent c~lctrlus which is, roughly speaking, sequent 
calculus without weakening and contraction. Since the framework is classical, it is 
necessary, in order to get a decent proof-theoretic structure, to consider pruojhets 
which are the natural deduction of linear logic; i.e., a system of proofs with multiple 
conclusions, which works quite well. 
Qne of the main outputs df linear logic seems to be in coimputer science: 
(i) As long as the exponzntia.s 1 ! and ? are not concerned, we get a very sharp 
control on normalization; linear logic will therefore help us to improve the efficiency 
of programs. 
(ii) The new connectives of linear logic have obvious meanings in terms of 
parallel computation, especially the multiplicatives. In particular, the multiplicative 
fragment can be seen as a system of communication without problems of synchroniz- 
ation. The synchronization is handled by proof-boxes which are typical of the 
additive level. Linear logic is the first attempt to solve the problem of parallelism 
at the logical level, i.e., by making the success of the communication process only 
dependent of the fact that the programs can be viewed as proofs of something, and 
are therefore sound. 
(iii) There are other potential fields of interest, e.g., databases: the use ofcfassica4 
logic for modelling automatic reasoning has led to logical atrocities without any 
practical output. One clearly needs more subtle logical tools taking into account 
that it costs something to make a deduction, a guess, etc.; linear logic is built on 
such a principle (the phases) and could serve as a prototype for a more serious 
approach to this subject. 
(iv) The change of logic could change the possibilities o 
sinclb linear negation allows a symmetric clausal framewor 
problems of classical sequent calculus. 
4 J. Y. Girard 
r logic expllaind to a pr0oGtheorist 
mere is no constructive logic beyond intuitionistic logic: mo&I @ic, inside which 
intuitionistic connectives can be faithfully translate is nonconstructive; various 
log& which have been considered in the philosophical tradition lack the seriousness 
that is implicitlZy need\.9 (a clean syntax, cut-elimination, semantics, etc.) and, ic 
the best case, they present themselves as impoverishments of intuitionism, while we 
arc of course seeking something as strong as intuitionism but more subtle. The 
philosophical exegesis of Heyting’s &es leaves in fact very little room for a further 
discussion of the intuitionistic ca’lcelus; but has anybody ever seriously tried? In 
fact, linear logic, which is a clear and clean extension of usual logic, can be reached 
through a more perspicuous analysis of the semantics of proofs (not very far from 
the computer-science approach and thus relegated to the next section), or by certain 
more or less immediate considerations about sequent calculus. These considerations 
are of immediate geometrical meaning but in order to understand them, one has to 
forget the intentions, remembering, with a Chinese leader, that it is not the colour 
of the cat that matters, but the fact it catches mice. 
119.1. The maintenance of space in sequeni cahlus 
When we write a sequent in classical logic. in intuitionistic or minimal logic, the 
only difference is the maintenance of space: in classical logic we have n +- m rooms 
separated by +; in minimal logic m = 1, while in intuitionistic logic m = Q or 1. Into 
the three cases we build particular connectives which belong to such and such 
tradition + $_,dt beyond any traS:‘.tion we are extremely free, provided we respect an 
implicit symmetry that is essential for cut-elimination. 
Now, what is the meaning of the separation I--? The classical answer is “to separate 
positive and negative occurrences”. This is factually true but shallow; we shall get 
a better answer by asking a better question: what in the essence of I- makes the two 
latter logies more constructive than the classical one? For this the answer is simple: 
take a proof of the existence or the disjunction property; we use the fact that the 
last rule used is an introduction, which we cannot do classically because of a possible 
contraction. Therefore, in the minimal and intuitionistic cases, I- serves to mark a 
place where contraction (and maybe weakening too) is forbidden; classically speak- 
ing, the + does not have quch a meaning, and this is why lazy people very often 
only keep the right-hand side of classical sequents. Once we hate recognized that 
the constructive features of intuitionistic logic come from the dumping of structural 
rules on a specific place in the sequents, we are ready +o face the consequences of 
this remark: the limitation should be generalized to the other rooms, i.e., weaxening 
and contraction disappear. As soon as weakening and contraction‘ have been forbid- 
den, we are in linear logic. 
U.2. Linear logic as 41 sequent cdwlus 
nores the left/right-asymmetry of intuitionism; in particular, one 
directly deal with right-handed sequents. The first thing to do is to try to rewrite 
familiar connectivds in this framework where sti’uctural rules have been limited to 
exchange; in particular, the two possible traditions for writing the right n-rule: 
which are equivalent in classical sequent calculus ~odulo easy structural mani 
tions, new become two radically different conj *&ons: 
- rule (M) treats the contexts by juxtaposition and yields the mdt@licariue conjunc- 
tion 0 (times); 
- rule (A) treats the contexts by identification, and yields the ad&ice conjunction 
& (with). 
The vaultkey of the system is surely linear negation (.)’ . This negation, although 
constructive, is involutive! All the desirable De Morgan formulas can be written 
with (.)A, without losing tne usual constructive features. Through the DC Morgan 
translations, the other elementary connectives are easily accessible: the multiplicative 
disjunction V (par) and the additive one 0 ( plus) and iinear implication - (entails). 
The last connective was the first to find its way ir.“o official life and it has given its 
name to the full enterprise. 
There is a philosophical tradition of ‘strict implication’ amounting to Lewis. In 
some sense, linear implication agrees with this tradition: in a linear implication, the 
premise is used ‘once’, in the sense that weakening and contraction are forbidden 
on the premise (in fact ‘once’ + neans only something in multiplicative terms, i.e., 
w.r.t. juxtaposition: additively. speaking, the premise can be used several times. 
A --o A@ A is not derivable, but A --o A&A is). Even if this philosophical tradition 
has not been very successful, the existence of linear logic gives a retrospective 
justification to these attempts. 
The most hidden of all linear connectives is oar, which came to light purely 
formally as the De Morgan dual of 0 and which can be seen as the effective part 
of a classical disjunction. Typicaily, A - A, which everybody understands, is literally 
the same as AL T A. 
11.3. Strength of linear logic 
Is linear logic strong enough? In other terms, is it possible to translate usual logic 
(especially intuitionistic logic) into linear logic? If w-e look at usual connectives, we 
discover that some laws belong to the multiplicative universe (c.g., A - A), and 
others to the additive realm (e.g., the equivalence between A and A & A). In fact, 
no translation works, for a very simple reason: since there are no structural rules, 
the proofs diminish in size during normalization! This feature, one of the most, 
outstanding qualities of linear logic, definitely forbids any decent translation on the 1 
basis of the connectives o far written. The only solution is to allow weakening and 
contraction to some extent; in order to do so, the exponentiab ! and ? are introduced; 
these modalities indicate the possibility of structural rules on the formula beginning 
with them. For linear proofs involving these modalities, a loss of control over the 
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normalization times occurs, as expected. Roughly speaking, one can say that usual 
logic (which can be viewed as the adjunction of the modalities) appears as a passage 
to the limit in linear logic since, for ?A to be equivalent with ?A T? ?A, we have to 
like an infinite “par”. The translation of intuitionistic lo 
A0 = A for A atomic, 
(AA B)‘=A’$ B”, (A v B)‘= !A’@? ! (A+B)‘= !A’-+ B”, 
(lA)‘= !A’- (0 is one of the constants of the system), 
(Vx.A)’ = /\ x.A”, (3x.A)’ = V x.!A” 
(/\ and V are the linear quantifiers, about which there is little to say except that V 
is effective, and the De Morgan dual of A !). 
Let us give an example in order to show the kind of unexpected istinctions that 
linear logic may express; for this, we shall assume that the formula A is quantifier- 
free, and. is represented in linear logic in such a way that “or” between instances 
of A becomes “‘18”. We claim that linear logic can write a formula with this meaning: 
3xAxy and this with a Herbrand expansion of length 2. Intuitionistic logic can 
handle the Herbrand expansion of length 1 and classical ogic can handle the general 
case with no bound on the length, but the much more interesting case of a given 
length bound was not expressible in usual logics. People with some proof-theoretic 
background know that a Herbrand expansion of length 2 can be rewritten as a 
sequent FAtx, Aux’, with x, x’ not free in t, x’ not free in u (midsequent heorem). 
Now, the formula 
o/x AYAxV) q o/x AYAXY) 
of linear logic will be cut-free provable exactly when a sequent of the above kind 
is provable. 
11.5. 7%e semantics of linear logic: phases 
The sentence saying that usual logic is obtained from linear logic by a passage 
to the limit is reminiscent of the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. 
There is a Tarskian semantics for linear logic with some physical flavour: w.r.t. a 
certain monoid of phases formulas are true in certain situations. The set of all phases 
for which a formula may be true is called a fact, among which the fact of orthogonal 
phases plays a central role to represent he absurdity _L. Qne easily defines the 
f a fact and by restricting to facts which are themselves orthogonals, 
esenting linear negation. There usual connectives 
are easily defined: i[ion, whereas - is the dephasing, i.e., A - is 
the set of all p such that j~.pL c B, where the phase spaze, although commutative, is 
Linear logic 7 
being written multiplicatively. A fact is said to hold when it contains the unit phase 
1. This semantics is complete and sound w.r.t. linear logic. One of the wild hopes 
that this suggests is the possibility of a direct connection with quant 
mechanics . . . but let’s not dream tao much! 
. Linear logic explained to a (theoretical) co 
There are still people saying that, in order to make computer science, one 
essentially needs a soldering iron; this opinion is shared by logicians who despise 
computer science and by engineers who despise theoreticians. However, in recent 
years, the need for a logical study of programmation has become clearer and clearer 
and the linkage logic-computer-science seems to be irreversible. 
(i) For computer science, logic is the only way to rationalize ‘bricolage’; for 
instance, what makes resolution work is not this or that trick, but the fundamental 
results on sequent calculus. More: if one wants to improve resolution, one has to 
respect he hidden symmetries of logic. In similar terms, the use of typed systems 
(e.g., the system F), is a safeguard against errors of various sorts, e.g., loops or 
bugs. Moreover, in domains where the methodology is a bit hesitating, as in 
parallelism, logic is here as the only milestone. In some sense, logic plays the same 
role as the one played by geometry w.r.t. physics: the geometrical frame imposes 
certain conservation results, for instance, the Stokes formula. The symmetries of 
logic presumably express deep conservation of information, in forms which have 
not yet been rightly conceptualize& 
(ii) For logic, computer science is the first real field of application since the 
applications to general mathematics have been too isolated. The applications have 
a feedback to the domain of pure logic by stressing neglected points, shedding new 
light on subjects that one could think of as frozen into desperate staticism, as 
classical sequent calculus or Heyting’s semantics of proofs. Linear logic is an 
illustration of this point: everythi g has been available to produce it since a very 
long time; in particular, retrospec vely, the syntactic restriction on structural rult7 
seedms so obviously of interest that one can hardly understand the delay of fifty 
years in its study. Computer science prompted this subject through semantics: The 
idea behind Heyting’s semantics of proofs is that proofs are functions; this idea has 
been put into a formal correspondence between proofs and functional systems by 
Curry, Howard, and De Bruijn. The tradition on yting’s semantics is of little 
interest because it is full of theological distinctions the style: “how do we prove 
that this a proof’, etc.; csmputer scientists have attacked more or less the same 
question, but with t& idea ef concentrating on the material part of these pr 
or functions. This has led to Scott semantics 
subject; however, Scott’s semantics is 
what is called finite in these domains is not finite in any reasonable sense (noetherian 
would have been a happier terminology) and in particular, the fact that arbitrary 
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objects are approximable by finite ones only because we have abused the word 
‘finite’. In recent work in 1985, the present author has made essential simplifications 
of Scott’s work: by use of a more civilized approach to function spaces one can 
work with qualitative semantics (rebaptized here to coherent spaces) in which 
finiteness is finiteness. Moreover, all basic definitions involving coherent spaces are 
very simple and a certain number of features that were hidden be&id the heavy 
apparatus of Scott domains are brought to light, in particular, the discovery that 
the arrow is not primitive. 
III. 1. 7he semantics of linear logic: coherent spaces 
A coherent space is a graph on a set (the web of the space). What counts as an 
object in this space is any subset of the graph made of pairwise compatible (we 
say: coherent) points. The interpretations made in 1984-85 gave very simple interpre- 
tations for the intuitionistic connectives in terms of coherent spaces as schemes for 
building new coherent spaces. Now, it turns out that there are intermediate construc- 
tions; typically, the function space X* Y can be split into 
- the fomlation of the ‘repetition space’ !X = X’; 
_ the formation of the linear implication X’ - Y. 
Later, - can in turn be split as X - Y = X1 78 Y, but this is a bit more dubious 
since X’19 Y=Xl -0 Y, so there is some subjectivity in deciding which among the 
two multiplicatives is more primitive (not to speak of @!). 
In r&t, after some times, one arrives at the following stock of operations: 
()I, 78, ‘-0, 0, &, 0, !, ?; usual functional types admit decompositions according to 
the formulas in Section 11.3. One can imagine other linear connectives (e.g., a 
primitive equivalence) which, although very natural, do not lead to any logical 
system. What is outstanding here is that the decomposition can also be carried out 
at the logid level; i.e., that these new connectives have all qualities of a logic This 
logic has already been disclosed before, but we have to look again at its proof-system, 
as will be done in the following section. 
111.2. Proof-nets: a classical natural deduction 
In the beginning (say: up to the end of ‘85) things remained simple because it 
was not clear that the intuitionistic framework was an artificial limitation; at that 
moment, (.)I, 9, and ? were still in statu nascendi. It was therefore possible to keep 
a functional notation for the proofs of this intuitionistic linear logic: for instance, 
the formation of the linear application tu was subject to the restriction FV( t) n 
FV( u) = 0; for the additive pair &tu, the restriction was FV( t) = FV( u), for linear 
lambda abstraction Lx. t, the restriction was x E FV( t), etc. This gave a reasonable 
system, still of interest, however with the defect of too many connectives involving 
commutative conversions (@CD, !). The conviction that the system should be relevant 
to parallelism and the rough analogy ‘sequential = intuitionistic, parallel = classical’ 
produced a shift to the ‘classical’ framewor 9 where sequents are left/ light-symmetric 
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with bad consequences for normalization since it is well-known that no decent 
natural deduction exists in classical frameworks. However, linear logic is not SO 
bad since it has been possible to define a notation of ‘proof-net’ which is a proof 
with several conclusions. (It seems that the problem is hopeless in usual classical 
logic and the accumulation of several inconclusive attempts is here to back up this 
impression. In linear logic, we can distinguish between, for instance, the multiplica- 
tive features of disjunction, which deserve a certain treatment, and the additive 
ones, which deserve another treatment; trying to unify both treatments would lead 
to a mess.) 
In fact, the core of proof-nets consists in studying the multiplicative fragment, 
which is handled in a very satisfactory way: starting with axioms A A* one develops 
proof structures by combination of two binary rules, or links, 




Most of these structures are incorrect because the left-hand side may work in a way 
contradicting the right-hand side. Now the soundness criterion is as follows: to each 
multiplicative link is associated a switch with two positions “I,” and “IV’; an ideal 
particle (representing the flow of input/output inside the proof) tries to travel starting 
from a given formula, and in a given direction (upwards: question, or downwards: 
answer); at each moment, the particle knows (the switches are here to help) where 
to go, so it eventually makes a cyclic trip. 
The soundness requirement is simple: for any positioning of the n switches, the 
trip is long, i.e., it goes twice through all formulas, once up, once down; in other 
terms, the whole structure has been visited, and every question has been answered, 
every answer has been questioned. Clearly, the most difficult result of the paper is 
to prove that this notion of proof-net is equivalent to a sequent calculus approach, 
i.e., can be sequentialized. The full calculus does not have such a system: it is 
handled through the concept of proof-box, which is a lazy device: moments of 
sequentialization are put into boxes and the boxes are interconnected in the perfect 
multiplicative way already explained. 
The soundness conditions for proof-nets (absence of shorttrips) should nDt be 
misunderstood: it is not a condition that should be practically verified because, &vith 
n switches, we essentially have 2” verifications to make. It must be seen as w 
abstract property of these parallel proofs that we are not supposed to check ~JJ; 
means of a concrete algorithm. (In the san”,e Y:UY, the fact that an object of type 
int+nt of F when applied to an integer n’ yields, after normalization, an integer 
fi need not be checked; this, however, is an important abstract property of F). 
However, we want to work with proof-nets as programs, and when we have one, 
we want to be sure by some means that it is actually a proof-net; this is why methods 
for generating proof-nets are very important, an now the following ones: 
(i) Deseguentialization of a proof in linear sequent calculus: we can i 
this as the most standard way to obtain a he user would pr 
source program (in linear sequent calculus), and this program would be compiled 
as a proof-net, i.e., as a graph between occurrences of formulas. 
(ii) Logical operations between proof-nets: for instance, a proof-net p with two 
conclusions A and B can be connected to a proof-net p’ with conclusion Al, by 
means of the cut-link in Fig. l(a). Here, /3 has been seen as a (linear) function 
taking as arguments objects of type A’ (proof-nets admitting A’ as conclusion) 






The picture is however wholly symmetrical; one can also apply p to an argument 
p” of type B’, and this yields a result of type A as shown in Fig. l(b). One can 
also combine both ideas and apply p to both p’ and p” etc.; when we say that we 
‘apply’ p to p’, this is really to explain the things very elementarily because one 
could have said that /3’ is applied to p. There is a perfect function/argument symmetry 
in linear logic. 
(iii) Normalization : There is a normalization procedure which eliminates the use 
of the cut-link. When we normalize a proof-net, then the result is still a proof-net, 
as we can easily prove. In the study of normalization, the structure 
A A’ 
CUT 
plays an important role: first, this is not a proof-net, because there is the shorttrip 
A*, A& A^ etc.; second, it would be a ‘black hole’ in the normalization process, 
i.e., a structure hopelessly normalizing into itself. If we try to imagine what could 
be the meaning of this pattern, think of a variable of type A (denoting the address 
of a memory case) calling itself. To some extent, the conditions on trips are here 
just to forbid this ‘black hole’ and to forbid by the way all situations that would 
lead to such a pattern by normalization, etc. 
Although we can deal with concrete proof-nets without a feasible characterization, 
alternative definitions of soundness are welcome. One can expect from them two 
kinds of improvements: 
(i) feasibility, i.e., tht possibility to use proof-nets directly that have been written 
on 9 screen for instance; 
(ii) the extension of the a vantages of the arallel syntax outside the multiplicative 
fragment; for instance, the weakening rules for ( _L) and (?) are handled in terms 
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of boxes because our definition of rip excludes disconnected nets. Surely, some 
disconnected nets are however acceptable, but we have not found any simple 
soundness characterization for them. 
111.3. Normalization for pro~jk~ts 
There is a radical and quick procedure for normalizing the multiplicative fragment 
of proof-nets. The full language is more delicate to handle because the cut-rule 
sometimes behaves badly w.r.t. boxes; in particular, it is difficult to define a terminat- 
ing normalization process for the full calculus with a Church-Rosser property. 
we have to be a little more careful: 
(i) Although the Church-Rosser property is lost, there is a semantic invariance 
of the normalization process which ensures that no serious divergence can be 
obtained. 
(ii) One can even represent a proof-net by a family of slices, and this representa- 
tion is Church-Rosser. Unfortunately, the status of slices is far from being well- 
understood and secured. 
(iii) One can expect to be able to improve the syntax by reducing the number of 
boxes. The box of the rule (!) is an absolute one and one cannot imagine to remove 
it. But the boxes for 1 and ( IV?), for (8~) and for (/\) can perhaps be removed with 
various difficulties. The main problem is of course to find each time the ad hoc 
modification of the concept of trip and also to remain with a manageable condition. 
Anyway, there is a strong normalization theorem for PN2 which generalizes the 
familiar result of [l] for F. The methodology combines the old idea of candidut de 
r6ductibilite’ (CR) with phase-like duality conditions; it is very instructive to remark 
that a CR defined by duality immediately has a lot of properties which, in *he old 
works (e.g., [2]), we were forced to require explicitly! 
Cut-elimination plays the role of the execution of a program; here we must recall 
a point that is very important: proof-nets generalize natural deduction, which in 
turn is isomorphic to lambda-calculi with types. Hence, proof-nets are a direct 
generalization of typed lambda-calculus and a proof-net is as much expressive as 
a functional notation. It is sometimes difficult for computer scientists to go through 
this point: they are shocked by the fact that PN2 does not look like a functional 
calculus. In fact, the earlier versions were functional, using typed linear abstraction, 
etc.; but the functional notation is unable to make us understand this basic fact, 
namely, that a (linear) term t[xA] (of type B) should be simultaneously seen as a 
term u[ y BL] (of type A’). The functional notation is surely too expressive for our 
imagination to ever abolish its use; but at a very high degree of abstraction, it is 
clearly misleading and unadapted. ut, once more, proof-nets are lambda 
expressions, simply written in the way best adapted to their structure. The fact that 
they are quite remote from our usual habits or 
argument against heir use in ctimputer science: if there is ever any computer working 
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with linear logic, it is expected that the proof-nets will mostly be seen by the compiler, 
the user however -will use more traditional devices! 
111.4. Relevance for computer science 
Roughly speaking, proof-nets represent programs whose termination is guaranteed 
by the normalization theorem. The kind of programs obtained is quite different from 
those coming from intuitionistic logic; let us examine this in detail in the following 
sections. 
111.4.1. Questions and answers 
In typed lambda-calculus, a term t[xl , . . . , x,l of type [pi. . . . , a,]~ represents 
a communication between inputs of types ol,. . . , a, and an output of type 7. The 
communication works as follows: outputs ul, -. . , u, of types a,, . . . , Q,, can be 
substituted for x,, . l . , x,, yielding t[ul, . . . , u,]; recall that substitution is the func- 
tional analogue of the cut-rule. Now, the terminology ‘input/output’, although 
correct, is a bit misleading because we have a tendency to say that t waits for the 
inputs ul,..., u,, whereas it is preferable to realize that the inputs are in fact thr;: 
abstract symbols for inputs, i.e., the variables x1, . . . , x,,. For that reason, the 
terminology question (for x, , . . . 9 x,) and answer (for t) is more suited. In other 
terms, X, is a question answered by ui when doing the substitution. The functional 
approach to programmation is essentially asymmetric as the communication is 
always between several questions and one answer: this unique answer depends on 
the answers to the previous questions. For instance, the term x of type CT represents 
a very simple type of communication: the question is to find a term u of type CT 
and, from an answer to this question, we get the answer corresponding to the term 
bbC namely “u”. The communication is therefore just recopying. 
111.4.2. Towards parallelism 
Parallelism will occur as soon as we are able to break the Q/A-asymmetry between 
questions and answers. The most radical solution is the ability to exchange roles; 
i.e., a question could be seen as an answer and conversely. Lineaments of this 
situation appear in usual typed lambda-calculus: the term t[x], which is a communi- 
cation between a question of type Q and an answer of type 7, yields a term t’[v] 
which is a communication between a question of type r*p and an answer of type 
a=+~: t’[y] = hx.y( t[x]). The roles Q/A have been exchanged during this process; 
however, the transformation made is not reversible: the exchange of roles is hope- 
lessly mixed with other things and we cannot proceed any longer in this framework. 
In linear logic, this limitation is overcome: questions and answers play absolutely 
symmetric roles, which are interchanged by linear negation. A proof-net with con- 
een as a c munication net between answers of 
answer of type = question of type A’, 
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we can put it as, say, a communication between questions of types A+,. . . , A&, 
and an answer of type A,,, and this immediately sounds more familiar! 
Typically, the axiom link A Al, which is a communcation between two answers 
of types /r and A’, can be seen as the trivial communication between either a 
question of type AL and an answer of the same type, or between a question of type 
A ‘* = A and an answer of the type A. The cut-rule w, which puts together two 
questions of orthogonal types (or a question and an answer of the same type), is 
the basic way to make the communication effective. 
111.4.3. Communication a d trips 
In spite of the equality between an answer and a question of the orthogonal type, 
the two things should be distinguished a little! for instance, in the basic sequential 
case (Section 111.4.1) the communication is from the question (variables) to the 
answer (the term). This distinction is essentially the one used for trips: AA stands 
for a question of type A*, where A, stands for an answer of type A. In other terms, 
when we move upwards, we question; when we move downwards, we answer! 
The way communication works is well explained by the trips: 
(i) In a CUT-link w the trip algorithm: ‘from A,, go to AIA and from At 
go to A^‘, is easily explained as: an answz of type A is replaced by a question of 
type A, and an answer of type A’- is replaced by a question of type Al: the questions 
met their answers. 
(ii) In the axiom link A AL, the interpretation is basically the same, the only 
difference being that, in the case of the cut, an answer is changed into a question, 
whereas in the case of the axiom, a question becomes an answer. 
(iii) The multiplicatives @ and 79 are the two basic ways of living concurrence: 
in both cases, a question of type (A m B)‘- has to be seen as two separate questions 
of type AL and B’; an answer of type A m B has to be seen as two separate answers 
of types A and B. IIowever, 
- in the case of 0, there is no cooperation: if we start with AA, then we come back 
through A, before entering B” after which =we come back through 8,; 
_ in the case of 78, there is cooperation: if we start again with AA, then we are 
expected through B, , from which we go to BA and eventually come back through 
A”. 
(iv) The additives & and @ correspond to superposition, whose typical example 
is the instruction IF-THEN-ELSE: 
- in terms of answers, the type A & B means one answer of each type; 
- in terms of questions, the type A & B means either a questiop of type A or a 
question of type B. (The meaning of 0 is explained by duality.) 
In particular, only one of the answers occurring in an answer of type A 8~ B is 
of interest, but we do not know which until the corresponding question is clearly 
asked. This is why the rule (&) works with boxes in which we put the two alternatk 
answers so that this su o&ion is isolate e rest. 
feattire. 
(v) The exponentials ! and ? correspond to the idea of storage: 
- an answer of type !A corresponds to the idea of writing an answer of type A in 
some stable register so that it ca e used ad nausearn. 
- a question of type !A correspon o several questions of type A, ‘several’ being 
extremely unspecified (0 times: le ( W?), 1 time: rule (D?), etc.), i.e., is an 
iterated reading. 
The fact that the rule (!) works wit boxes expresses the idea of storage. 
111.4.4. Work in progress 
In the previous section we expla ed the general pattern of communication in 
linear logic; compared to extant wo on parallelism, especially Milner’s approach, 
the main navelty lies in the logical a& i.e., parallelism should work for internal’ 
logical reasons and not by chance. Systems like F, which are of extremely general 
interest for sequential computatio work because they are logically founded. 
(Remember that F is the system of p fs of second-order intuitionistic propositional 
calculus.) For similar reasons, the programs coming from linear logic are proofs 
within a very regular logic and this ives the good functioning of such programs 
(in terms of communication) at a t oretical levc! At a more practical level, all 
these general ideas have to be put into more conq.;rete proposals and this will be 
done in separate publications among which “he foI;owing are expected quite soon: 
- A paper with Yves Lafont, concentrating on the nonparallel aspects, in particular 
the new treatment of data suggested by linear logic; the formalism used is 
intuitionistic linear logic. 
- A paper with Gianfranso Mascari, concentrating .ln the parallel aspects of Sinear 
logic; in particular, it will give some more detaih. for a concrete implementation. 
ns asiuofum: from usual im tion to linear implication* 
What is the use of semantics of programming languages? 
(1) Some peopie think that the rpose of a semantics is io interpret sets of 
equations in a complete way; in so sense, ihti semantics comes like the oficial 
blessing on OUI- language, rules, etc.: they are perfect and cannot be improved. The 
success of this viewpoint lies in G5del’s complctcness theorem which guarantees, 
for any consistent system of axioms, a complete semantics. 
(2) A more controversial viewpoin consists in looking for disturbing semantics, 
which shed unexpected lights on the stems we know. Of course, this viewpoint is 
highly criticizable since there is no a lute certainty that anything will result from 
In this, our approach is radically different from the idea of an external logical comment to parakiism 
by means of modal, temporal, etc. logics. 
* Remark on notations: the symbol ?? is not accessible on a word processor; I therefore propose to 
replace it by U and simultaneously :o replace & by the symbol 1-7; it is important that the two symbols 
remind one of another. 
Linear logic 95 
such attempts. But the stakes are clearly higher than in the hagiographic viewpoint 
(1) and a change of syntax (as the one coming with linear logic) may occur from 
disturbing semantics. 
Let us explain what is the starting disturbance that led to linear logic: the semantics 
of coherent spaces (qualitative domains in [4]), developed in Section 3 below, works 
as follows in the case of an implication. 
dinition. If X and Y are two coherent spaces, then a stable function from 
X to Y is a function F satisfying: 
(Sl) ac b-, F(a)c F(b); 
(S2) aubEX+F(anb)=F(a)nF(b); 
(S3) F commutes with directed unions. 
IV.2. Theorem (see [4,5]). With any stable function Ffrom X to Y, associate the set 
Tr( F) defined by 
Tr( F) = {(a, z) ; a finite object of X, z E F(a) such that 
zEF(b) andbca+b=a). 
Then, for any c E X, we have 
F(c)={z;3accsuch that (a,z)ETr(F)}. (1) 
Moreover, the set of all sets Tr( F), when F varies through all stable functions from X 
to Y, is a coherent space X+ Y which can be independently defined by 
(a,z)C(b, t)[ranodX+Y] iff (1) avbEX+zCt[mod Y], 
(2) avbEXanda#b+z#t. 
IV. 1. Interpretation of functional languages 
Theorem IV.2 is enough to interpret h-abstraction and application in typed 
languages; the formation of the trace, encoding a function by a coherent set, interprets 
h-abstraction whereas application is defined by means of formula (1) above. Beta- 
and eta-conversion are immediately seen to be sound w.r.t. this semantics. 
IV.2. The disturbance 
If one forgets the fact that coherent spaces are extremely simpler than Scott 
domains, nothing unexpected has occurred: the semantics follows the same lines 
as Scott-style interpretation. The novelty is that, for the first time, we have a readable 
definition of function space. The disturbance immediately comes from a close 
inspection of this definition: why not consider in endently : 
(I) a space of repetitions !X, 
(2) a more restricted for licatio 
efinition. Let X and Y be coherent spaces; a stable function F from X to 
Y is said to be linear when it enjoys the two conditions: 
(Ll) aubEX+F(aub)=F(a)uF(b), 
(L2) F(0) = 0. 
Equivalently, (Ll), (L2), and (S3) can be put together in one condition (L): 
(L) Assume that A t X is a set of pairwise coherent subsets of X; then F(U A) = 
II {F(a); a E 4. 
eorenr. A stable function F is linear iff its trace is formed of pairs (a, z), where 
the components a are singletons. 
roof. (a, z) E Tr( F) when z E F(a): this forbids a = 0 by (L2) and when a is 
mi&;:al w.r.t. inclusion among such pairs (b, z). Write a = a’u a”; then, from 
(a, z)cTr(F), we get ZE F(a)= F(a’)u F(a”), so XE Ffa’) or ZE F(a”). NOW, the 
minimality of a implies that a is a singleton. Cl 
efiaition. For linear maps, it is more suited to forget the singleton symbols; 
so we get the following characterization of the space X - Y formed of traces of 
linear maps from X to Y: 
(x, y)C( x’, y’) [mod X - Y] iff (1) x=x’ [mod X]+ y^vy’ [mod Y], 
(2) X-X’ [mod X] + y-y’ [mod Y], 
Formula (1) is now replaced by the formula of linear application: 
F(b) = {y ; 3x E b such that (x, y) E Tr( 6;)). (2) 
oition. If X is a coherent space, then !X is defined as follows: 
Iw=&ul, 
aZbmod!X iff aubEX. 
I V.3. 13re decomposition 
We clearly have: X = Y = !X - Y; in order to make this look like a decomposi- 
tion, we have to decoinpose h-abstraction and application; for linear functions, the 
trace and formula (2) will play the role of linear A-abstraction and linear application. 
e need two other operations connected with !: 
(i) when x E X, the formation of !x E !X: 
lx = (a ; a E x and a finite); 
(ii) the linearization of a function: if 6: is a stable map fr 
construct a linear stable map to simply by 
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Now, A-abstraction can be viewed as two operations: first linearization, then 
linear A-abstraction. 
application can be viewed as two operations too: applying a to b is the linear 
application of a to !b. 
IV.4. Further questions 
This already suggests to develop linear implication and f for themselves. 
there are a lot of other disturbing facts; for instance, nothing prevents us from 
considering the result of replacing a coherent space X by its dual X” where the 
roles of coherence and incoherence have been exchanged. But then X - Y is the 
same as YL - XL, i.e., linear functions are reversible in some sense. This immedi- 
ately suggests a classical framework (symmetry between inputs/outputs, or vari- 
ables/results, or questions/answers). Deep syntactic modifications come from simple 
semantic identifications. 
1. The phase semantics 
Usual finitary logics (we mean classical and intuitionistic logics) involve a certain 
conception of semantic’s which may be described as follows: truth is considered as 
meaningful independently of the process of verification. In particular, this imposes 
strong limits on the propositional parts of such logics and, for instance, starting 
with the general idea of conjunction we are hopelessly led to ‘A dk B true iff A true 
and B true’. By admitting several possible worlds, the intuition&tic semantics (Kripke 
models) allows more subtle distinctions, promoting drastically new connectives (the 
intuitionistic disjunction) while being extremely conservative on others Icon- 
junction j. 
The change of viewpoint occurring in linear logic is simple and radical: we have 
to introduce an obseme7; in order to verify afact A, the observer has to do something, 
i.e., there are tasks p, q,. . . which verify A (notation: p /= A, q /- A,. . .). These 
tasks can be seen as phases between a fact and its verification; phases form a monoid 
P and we shall consider that a fact is verified by the observer when there is no 
phase between him and the fact, i.e., when I/= A. The idea of introducing phases 
makes a radical change on our possible connectives, which we shall explain by 
starting with the idea of a conjunction: 
(i) “&“: jay that p /= A & B when p /= A and p /= B; 
(ii) “0”: say that pq /=A@ B when p /= A and q /= B? 
In the case of “8~” the task p shares two verifications, while in the case of ‘“@‘“, 
the verification is done by dispatching the total task pq between A and B: p verifies 
A and q verifies B. These two connectives have very different behaviours, as expected 
from their distinct semantics. 
3 The definition given here is slig!Ay incorrect and has been simplified for pedagogic purposes. 
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By the way, observe that 33” appears as a noncommutative operation. In order 
to keep the simplicity of the theory at this early stage of development, we shall 
make the hypothesis of the commutativity of P, i.e., we shall develop commutative 
linear logic. The noncommutative case is obviously more delicate and we have not 
accumulated enough materials in the commutative case to be able to foresee the 
general directions for a noncommutative linear Ilogic; also we should have some 
real reason to shift to noncommutativity ! 
Semantically sneaking, let us identify a fact A with the set { p ; p I= A} so that a 
fact appears as a set of phases. Among all facts, we shall distinguish the absurd 
fact 1, which is an arbitrary fixed subset of I? Given any subset G of P, we define 
(w.r.t. 1) its dual cr”; facts will be exactly those subsets G of P such that GAL = G= 
The basic linear connectives are then easily developed as those operations leading 
from facts to facts. 
LE. Dediolttisa. A phase space P consists in the following data: 
(i) a morioid, still denoted P, and whose elements are called phases; the monoid 
is supposed to be commutative, i.e., 
- neutrality: lp = pl = ,o for all p E P, 
- commutativity: pq = qp for ail p, q E P, 
W associati;ity: (pq)r = p( qr) for all p, q, r E P; 
(ii) a set L P (often denoted I for short), the set of antiphases of R (One can also 
say “orthogona: phases”.) 
nition. Assume that G is a subset of P; then we define its duaZ G* by 
Gl={pE P;Wq(qEG+pqea)}. 
dhition. A fact is a subset G of P such that GL1 = G; the elements of G 
are ca jtled the phases of G; G is valid when 1 E G. 
ies 
(i) For any Gc P, Gc G’l; 
(ii) For any G, Hc P, Gc H-+WLc Gl; 
(iii) G is a fact i$ G is of the form H’ for some subset H of P. 
ct because I={ l}‘-. 
= I’; then, observe that 1~ 1; moreover, if p, q E 
and q E G, then pq E GIL). Hence, 1 is a submonoid 
allest fact (w.r.t. inchsimj. 
. Facts are closed under arbitrary intersections. 
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If (Gi)ie 1 iS a family of facts, th 
facts. El 
= (U Gf) ’ and ( 1 Gi are therefore 
. The connective nil (line egution) 3s defined by duality: if is a 
ear negation is (3’. 
i.e., G*” = G. 
ve been made so that nil is an involution, 
1.8. Definition. The multiplicative con ctives (or muitiplicatives) are the con- 
nectives times, par and entails; all three efinable from the operation of product 
of subsets of P: if G, H c P, then GH = ;pcG and ~EH}. 
(i) If G and H are facts, their para ion (connective pur) G T!? is defineti 
by G 38 H = (G%H’)h 
(ii) If G and H are facts, their tenso tion (connective times) GO H is define 
by G@H=(G.H)-“. 
(iii) If G and H are facts, their line 
by G - H = (G.Hl)I. 
lica tion (connective en tails) is defined 
1.9. Basic properties of multiplicatives. ( ny multiplicative can be ned from any 
other and nil: 
G@H=(G’THL)L, G-Q 
G 79 H =(G”@HL)‘, G- H=(G@HH)L, 
GVH=G’-H 3 G@ H = (G -0 H1)? 
(ii) par and times are commutative and associative; Aey admit neutral elements 








roof. (i) is immediate from the definitions; once (i) has 
,_ii) can be reduc to the particu?m case of i.e., asso~iativity, co 
and neutrality of for this connective; among ese properties only associativity 
deserves some attention: we shall prove that ( G 0 
property is easily reduced to the following lemma. 
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. If F, G are two subsets of P, then (F.G)‘L~ FLL.Gi”. 
Assume that p E F*l, q E G”; we have to show that, given any v E (F.G)‘, 
pqv E _L; the hypothesis v E (FIG)‘-, however, means that, for all f E F and g E G, 
n particular, if we fix f e F, it follows that vf E GL = GILL, hence, vfq E L. 
‘3r similar reasons, vq E F’- = FL-‘*, so vpq E 1. A Cl 
mark. There is the following illuminating alternative definition of G - H: 
PEG-OHiff,forallq~G,pq~H 
. nition. The additive connectives (or additives) are the connectives with 
and plus which are obtained from the boolean operations: 
(i) If G and H are facts, then their direct product (connective with) G & H is 
definedby G&H=GnH. 
(ii) If G and H are facts, then their direct sum (connective plus) GO H is defined 
by GO H = (Gv H)‘? 
1.12. Basic 
principle 
properties of additives. (i) 7%e additives are interrelated byaDe 
( 1 ii with and plus are commutative 
which are T L: nd 0 respectively: 




utivity properties. (i) @I is distributive w. r. t. 0, and 29 is distributive wr. t. 
G@(HOK)=(GOH)@(G@K), G??(H&K) 
=(GVH)&(G%‘K), 




etween @ and 0, there is only ‘haFdistributivity’ 
)@(G?!?M)cG%‘( 
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roof. Let us concentrate on the first distributivity property; the following lemma 
is of general interest. 
1.93.1. Lemma. If G is any subset of P, then GLL is the smallest fact conk 
Proof. There is a smallest fact containing G, namely the intersection of all facts 
containing G; let us call it S; clearly, S c G**, from which we get G” c S’l c 
G **‘*, and so G** = S’-’ = S. Cl 
Proof of Properties 1.13 (continued). Now, observe that G.(Hu K)I’c 
(G.(Hu K))l (Lemma 1.9.1); but G.(H u K) = G-31 u G-K, from which we get 
G.(Hv K)“c(G.HuG.K)“c(G@H)@(G@K). 
By Lemma 1.13.1, G@(H@K)c(G@H)@(G@K). 
Conversely, starting with G.Hc GO(HOK) and G-Kc G@(H@K), we get, 
by Lemma 1.13.1, C@Hu GO K c G@(H@K),and,byLemma1.13.1oncemore, 
, ‘: 
(G@K)c G@(H@K). 0 
Up to now we have described the propositional framework of linear logic. This 
part is the most important part of linear logic, the one which is the most radically 
different from usual logics. For this fragment, we shall now set up a formal system 
and prove a completeness theorem; afterwards, we shall have a quick overview of 
the modalities and quantifiers which have been deleted for reasons of clarity. These 
new operations, although important, will not disturb too much the ordinance of 
things that is now taking shape. Our first syntactical concern is economy: we 
essentially need a multiplicative, an additive, and nil. We get a very nice syntax by 
adopting the following conventions: 
(i) The atomic propositions are together with propositional letters 
a, b, c, . . . and their duals a’, b’, c’-, . . . . 
(ii) Propositions are constructed from atomic ones by applyir, 3 the binary con- 
nectives 0, ??,@I, &. 
In particular, linear negation of a proposition is defined as follows: 
(A@B)‘= A-‘- ?? B’, 
(A@ B)‘= A’ & B’, (A & B)L = A’@ Bl. 
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This particular form of syntax without negation is not something deep; once more, 
this is just a way to avoid repetitions. 
1.14. Definition. (i) A phase structure for the propositional language just described 
consists in a phase space (P, &) and, for each propositional letter a, a fact as of IT 
(ii) With each proposition we associate its interpretation, i.e., a fact of P, in a 
completely straightforward way: the interpretation ofA in the structure S is denoted 
by As or S(A). 
(iii) A is valid in S when 1 E S(A). 
(iv) A is a linear tautology when A is valid in any phase structure S. 
1.15. Definition. We develop here a sequent calculus for linear logic; as expected 
from the peculiarities of our syntax, the sequenta will have no left-hand side, i.e., 
they will be of the form I-A,, . . . , A,. me real change w.r.t. usual logics ccnsists 
in the dumping of structural rules and, in fact, only the rule of exchange is left. Such 
a situation is more familiar than it seems at first sight since intuitionistic logic is 
built on such a restriction: the unique right-hand side formula in a special place in 
the sequent where contraction is forbidden. In linear logic this interdiction is 
extended to the whole sequent and weakening is forbidden as well. 
Logical axioms: 
I-A, A’-. 
(It is enough to restrict it to the case of a propositional letter a.) 
Cut rule: 






where B is obtained by permuting the formulas of A. 
Additive rules: 
I-T, A (axiom, A arbitrary) (no rule for 01, 
kA, C I-B, C 
-I-A&B,C 4 
t-A, C I-B, C 
r-A@ B, C 
10 
r-A@ B, C 
20. 
Multiplicative rules : 
t- (axiom), 
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The additional possibilities of linear logic can be ascribed to the dumping of the 
structural rules; in presence of these ru!es, for instance the rule (&) and the rule 
(0) would amount to the same. Without structural rules, the contexts (i.e., the 
unspecified lists of formulas A, B, C, etc.) which occur in the rules take a greater 
importance. In particular, if we start with the idea of a conjunction, there are two 
reasonable ways to handle the contexts: by juxtaposition (connective 0) or by 
identification (connective &). By the way, observe that contexts behave like phases 
and this will be the basis of the completeness argument. 
1.16. Proposition. Linear sequent calculus is sound w.r. t. validity in phase structures. 
Proof. We have not defined the interpretation of a sequent i-A; but, obviously, +A 
must be read as the par of its components (and, when the list is void, as I). We 
prove that, whenever i-A is provable, then it is valid in any phase structure 
(P, Ip, (as)). We argue by induction on a proof of A: 
(i) The proof consists of the axiom t-B, B ’ . B ?? BI = B - B and, by Remark 
1.10, 1 E S(B - B) = S(B) - S(B). 
(ii) The proof consists of the axiom t-T, A. The interpretation is of the form 
S(T) IB G, with G as fact; equivalently, S(0) - G, but since S(0) is the smallest 
fact of P, Op is included in G and, by Remark 1.10, 1 E S(O). 
(iii) The proof consists of the axiom i-1. The interpretation of 1 is 1 p and we 
have already observed that 1 E lp (Example l.S(ii)). 
(iv) The proof ends with a cut-rule. To prove the soundness of this rule, we 
have to show that, in case 1 E G V H and 1 E G’- ?? K, then i E H 38 K. This is easily 
seen if one puts G 79 H, G* 3 K, and H 38 K under the forms H’- - G, G - K 
and H’- - K and if one then applies Remark 1.10. 
(v) The proof ends with an exchange rule: immediate. 
(vi) The proof ends with (&). In order to prove the soundness of (&), we have 
to show that, in case 1 E G V K and 1 E H - K then 1 E (G & H) - K. This is 
immediate from the distributivitg law 1.13(i). 
(vii) The proof ends with (10) or (20). In order to prove the soundness of these 
rules, we have for instance to show that, in case 1 E G 79 K, then 1 E (GO H) 75’ K 
which is immediate from the half-distributivity of par w.r.t. plus (cf. Property 
l.l3(ii)). 
(viii) The proof ends with (I). In order to prove the soundness of (I), we have 
to show that, in case 1 E G, then 1 E S(I) 39 G; this is immediate from 1~ - G = G. 
(ix) The proof ends with (@). In order to prove the soundness of (Oi, we have 
to show that, in case 1 E F 3? G, 1 E H 38 K, then 1 E (FO H) 79 G 29 H. If these three 
facts are put as G ‘4 F, K-‘-J H, and (G1@K’)-(FOH), then we have, by 
hypothesis, G’ c F, K1 c H from which one deduces 6.’ @ 
(x) The proof ends with (79): immediate. Cl 
heorem. Linear sequent calculus is complete w.r. t. phase semantics. 
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Proof. For the time of the proof, let us adopt the following convention: we are 
dealing with sequences of formulas A, B, C, - . l up to their order, i.e., we are dealing 
with multisets of formulas. Multisets of formulas form a commutative monoid, when 
equipped with concatenation * and with 0 as a neutral element. This defines aphase 
space M, and the antiphases of 1M will just be those multisets A such that t-A is 
provable in linear sequent calculus (pedantically, in the variant without exchange, 
adapted to multisets of formulas). We claim the existence of a phase structure 
(M, lM, (as)) such that, for all formulas A, 
S(A) = {B ; t-A, B is provable in linear sequent calculus}. (3) 
Let US call the right-hand side of the equation (3) Pr(A). 
A crucial observation is that sets Pr(A) are facts of M; more precisely, that 
k(A) = I?r(AI)‘: if BE Pr(A) and if CE Pr(A’-), then F-A, B and t--Al, C are both 
provable and, by CUT’, so is I-B, C; hence, B * C E I,,,,. This shows &at b(A) c 
Pr(Al)‘. 
Conversely, if BE Pr(AI)I, observe that since I-A, A* is an axiom, AE Pr(A*); 
hence, A * BE I~, i.e., I-A, B is provable; but then B E Pr(A). It is therefore 
legitimate to define a phase structure Sby setting S(a) = Pr(a) for any propositional 
letter Q. 
By induction on the formula A, we prove that S(A) = Pr(A): 
(i) A is an atom CL: by dennition. 
(ii) A is of the form Q-? because S(a’) = S(a)* = Pr(a)‘= PI@“). 
(iii) A is 1: observe that _L~ = Pr( I) (immediate). 
(iv) A is 1: as in (ii). 
(v) A is T: the axiom for T yields S(T) = 1M = TM. 
(vi) A is 0: as in (ii). 
(vii) A is B & C: it is easily seen that t-8 & C, D is provable iff t-B, D and 
FC, D are both provable. From this we get Pr(A & B) = l%(A) & Pr( B) which is 
what is needed to go through this step. 
(viii) A is B@ C: from Pr(A & B) = Pr(A) & Pr( B), we easily obtain Pr(AO B) = 
I%(A)@ Pr( B), etc. 
(ix) A is BO C: Pr(A).Pr( B) c Pr(A@ B) (by the O-rule); hence, by Lemma 
1.13.1, Pr(A)OPr(B) c Pr(AO B). Conversely, if C E Pr(A@ B) and DE 
(Pr(A).Pr( B))-:, then I-D, A-$ B’- is provable and, by the rule (18) and a cut, we get 
a proof of t-D, C This shows the reverse inclusion, namely, Pr(A@ B) c h(A)@ 
WB). From this we can easily conclude our statement. 
(x) A is B 38 C: similar to (viii). 
Now, assume that A is a linear tautology; then A is valid in S, which means that 
0~ S(A) = I+(A); but then t-A is provable in linear sequent calculus. 0 
. (i) Usually, a completeness i  stated, not for logical calculi, but for 
e have given absolutely no meaning to the concept of ‘linear logical 
theory’. The reason is that if we were allowing an axiom, say A, to say that B is 
provable with the help of A, this has nothing to do with the provability of A - B; 
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in fact, this is equivalent to the provability of !A ---o B, where “!” is the connective 
‘of course’, which has not yet been introduced. 
(ii) The phase spaces P have been supposed to be commutative. If P were not 
commutative and if we restrict our attention to distinguished subsets of P (i.e., 
p. G = G.p for all p E P) (in particular, _t_ p must be distinguished), then one can 
develop the same theory as we did, and the connectives 0 and 38 are still commuta- 
tive. Of course, when we were thinking of a possible ‘noncommutative linear logic’, 
this is not the straightforward generalization that we have in mind, but something 
for which the multiplicatives would be noncommutative. 
Now that the main features of linear logic have been disclosed, let us complete 
the language to obtain a predicate calculus with the same expressive power as the 
usual ones. The first effort has to be made on the propositional part: one must be 
able to recover somewhere the structural rules. Let us call ?A a formula obtained 
from A which is ‘A-saturated w.r.t. the structural rules’. The fact that ?A comes 
from A can be expressed as A c ?A; the fact that one can weaken on ?A can be 
expressed as _L c ?A, and the fact that one can contract on ?A as ?A 3? ?A c ?A. 
But there are also other properties of ?A and everything will be summarized in the 
following definition. 
1.19. Definition. A topolinear space (P, 1, IF) consists in a phase space (P, 1) together 
with a set IF of facts of (P, I), the closedfacts; the following conditions are required: 
(i) IF is closed under arbitrary with; in particular, P E IF. 
(ii) IF is closed under finite par; in particular, 1 E IF. 
(iii\ 1 is indeed the smallest f3ct of IF: _I_ c F for all F E IF. 
(iv) par is idempotent on IF: F 2? F = F for all FE IF. 
The linear negation:, of closed facts are called open facts. 
efinition. The exponential connectives or modalities are the connectives of 
course and why not; both of them are definable in topolinear spaces: 
(i) If G is a fact, then its afirmation (connective of course) !G is defined as 
the greatesL ;w.r.t. inclusion) open fact included in G (the interior of G). 
(ii) If G is a fact, then its consideration (connective why not) ?G is defined as 
the smallest (w.r.t. inclusion) closed fact containing G (the closure of G). 
We now adapt our syntax so that we can handle the two modalities; first, the 
de$nition of linear negation is extended to the modalities by 
( A) ! L = ?(A*), (?A)l= !(A*). 
Then we have to give sequent rules for the modalities. In the definition below, ? 
is short for a sequence ?C,, . . . , ?C,. 
1.21. Definition. Linear sequent calculus is enriched with the following rules for 
modalities: 
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22. eorelIp. 7he calculus as extended in Dejinition 1.21 is sound and complete 
w.r.t. validity in topolineat structures, Le., the obvious analogue of phase structures 
where phase spaces have been replaced by topolinear spaces. 
Proof. (i): soundness. The soundness of dereliction comes from Fc ?E The sound- 
ness of weakening comes from I c ?F and the soundness of contraction from 
?F = ?F 3’ ?F. The soundness of (!) is the fact that if F c ?G, ‘38 l . l 38 ?G,,, then 
?Fc?Gt78’ . l V ?G,. This is because ?G, 38 l l l ‘18 ?G, is a closed fact and because 
?F is the smallest closed fact containing F. 
(ii): completeness. We define the phase space A4 as in the proof of Theorem 1.17. 
Now we define a topolinear structure IF on M by saying that the closed facts are 
just arbitrary intersections (i.e., with) of facts of the form S(?A). 
1.22.1. Lemma. Tlze set IE of all facts of the form S( ?A) satis#ies properties (ii)-( iv) 
(Definition 1.19) of topolinear spaces. 
f. (ii): The axiomatic system just described proves the linear equivalence 
?(AOB)-(?A)T?(?B) (C-Disshortfor (C-I))&@-C)): 
k-AL, A 
10 




+A*, A@ BD9 t-B*, A@ BDV t-Al, ?A w? FBI, ?B 
t-Al, ?A@ B, l I-BL, ?A@ B, l k-AL, ?A, ?; 
W? 
k-B’, ?A, ?B 
I-!Al, ?A@ Bmi!BL, ?A@ B 
. & 
0 
I-A’ & BL, ?A, ?B 
! 
I-!A’@!B’, ? A@ B, ?A@ B 
C? 
t-!A1 & B’, ?A, ?B 
79 




t-(?A 75’ =?B) - ?(A@ B) t-(?(A@ B)) - ?A 3’ ?B 
+(?A ?? ?B) - ?(A@ B) 
& 
rom this linear equivalence, it is plain that S(?A) 38 S(? 
)), so B is close 
Linear logic 27 
(iii): The equivalence I - is easily proved. From this, I E IE; also the weakening 
rule shows that M(lJc M(?A). 
(iv): From the equivalence A - AOA, it is easy to obtain ?A - ?( 
so ?A DQ (?A 39 ?A). From this we get S(?A) = S(?A) 79 S(?A). El 
Proof of Theorem 1.22 (continued). Now, F is made of arbitrary intersections of 
elements of IE. From this it is immediate that B satisfies properties (i) and (iii) of 
topolinear spaces. 
Now, if we observe that 79 is distributive w.r.t. arbitrary intersections, it is not 
difficult to get (ii) and (iv) for IF from Lemma 1.22.1. For instance, 
i)) T? (n S(?A,)) = n S(?Ai) 38 S(?AJ 
because S(?Ai) 18 S(?Aj) 3 S(?Ai), which in 
We have established that IF is a topolinear 
way that, in IF, 
turn follows from S( ?Aj) 3 I-, etc. 
structure. Now, IF is defined in such a 
?S(A)=n{S(?B);S(A)c S(?B)}=n (S(?B)+A- ?B is provable}. 
But, by rule (!), t-A - ?B is provable iff t-?A - ?B is; i.e., we finally find out that 
?S(A) = S( ?A) and this is enough to finish the completeness argument for Theorem 
1.22. n 
1.23. Remark. In spite of the obvious analogies with the modalities of modal logic, 
it is better to keep distinct notations, for at least two reasons: 
(ii) ! and ? are modalities within linear logic, while 0 and 0 are modalities 
inside usual predicate calculus; in particular, the rule (!) which looks like the 
introduction rule of Cl is perhaps not so close since the sequents are handled in a 
completely different way. 
(ii) The adoption of the modal symbolism would convey the idea of ‘yet another 
moda! sy&vn’, which is not quite the point of linear logic. . . . 
efinition. The quantijers are semantically defined as infinite generalizations 
of the additives; these quantifiers are A (any) and V (some). The semantic definitions 
are straightforward and boring and are left to the reader. The syntactic rules are 
Quan ti$er rules : 
(A) is subject to the familiar restriction on variables: x not free in If the reader 
has written the boring definition of the semantics, he can in_tum prove the following 
boring theorem, 
ase se ntics is so ica te 
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1.26. Remark. A and V are De-Morga dual; V is effective, which does not prevent 
it from being a linear negation! 
To understand what is going on in this section, think of the t’wo formalisms for 
the intuitionistic fragment ( A, +, W): NJ (natural deducticn) and LJ (sequent cal- 
culus). In LJ, the portion of proof from A, C, E I- F to A A B, C A 0, E I- F can be 
written in two different ways, whereas it& NJ there is only one way. According to 
Prawitz, the proofs in NJ should be viewed as true ones, while those in LJ are no 
longer primitive, i.e., a proof in LJ gives us instructions enabling us to recover a 
real proof in NJ. The issue is important, especially if we think of equality of normal 
forms and related questions. Unfortunately, already in the case of intuitionistic 
logic, something goes wrong with NJ when we consider the full language: the proofs 
in NJ cannot any longer be viewed as primitive since one needs additional iden- 
tifications between them (commutation des). The attempts to fix these defects by 
means of ‘multiple conclusion logics’ were never convincing. 
Linear logic is faced with the same question with a greater acuteness: on the one 
hand, since linear logic is constructive, linear proofs must be seen as programs 
whose execution involves a normal-form theorem. On the other hand, linear logic 
is ‘classical’ to some extent, which means that the commutation problems are bigger 
than they are in the intuitionistic case. These constraints made it necessary to have 
a second look at this question of ‘multiple conclusion logic’, but now making use 
of the linear connectives which enable us to make distinctions that were not accessible 
to people working on the same subject with usual logics. 
Proof-nets, which we are going to develop in this section, are the result of these 
investigations. The core of the theory is the multiplicative fragment, which works 
in an extremely satisfactory way. The extension of the theory to the full language 
is not SO good, but good enough to keep a reasonable fragment of the calculus free 
from any criticism. We first start with the multiplicative fragment: by this we mean 
the formulas built from atoms a, b, . . . , a’-, bL, by means of the connectives 0 and 







(The cut-rule, which has 
omitted from this study.) 
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exactly the same geometrical structure as the @-rule is 
Using these three patterns, we can construct (in a !-lay not difficult to imagine) 
proof-structures with several conclusions A,, . . . , A,. We would like to *make sure 
that such structures are sound, i.e., that they prove the par of their concllusion, i.e., 
A+- ?? A,. With usual proofs (written as trees), the soundness condition is local 
(i.e., one checks each rule separately), while, in a pattern with several conclusions, 
the left-hand side cannot act in contradiction with the right-hand side as typified 
in Fig. 2. Fig. 2(a) is sound, since I-A 0 B, A* 38 B* is provable, but Fig. 2(b) is 
not. In fact, (a) is sound because the two rules used are distinct. But what is the 
general global criterion of correctness? 
A J!.! Al 11 -I------ A B 
Aa B A1’dB1 Am B 
(a) (W 
Fig. 2. 
2.1. Definition. A proof-structure consists of the following objects: 
(i) Occurrences of formulas (i.e., to be pedantic, pairs (A, i), where A is the 
formula and the second component i serves to distinguish between two occurrences, 
etc.); there must be at least one formula occurring. 
(ii) A certain number of links between these (occurrences of) formulas. These 
links, which must be viewed as binary or ternary relations, are of the three kinds 
already mentioned: 
Axiom link: AX(A, i; A’, j) between an occurrence of A and an occurrence of 
A’-. This link is considered to be symmetric, i.e., it is the same as AX(Al,j; A, i)* 
This link hap no premise and two conclusions, namely (A, i) and (A’, j). 
Times link: @(A, i; B, j; A@ B, k). This link is not the same as @(B, j; A, i; A@ B, 
k); i.e., the link is not symmetric. The premises of the link are (A, i) and (B, j), and 
its conclusion is (A@ B, k). 
Par link: ??(A, i; B, j; A q B, k), whose premises are (A, i) and (B, j) and whose 
conclusion is (A 3’ B, k). This link is not symmetric. 
(iii) We require that 
I every occurrence of a formula In the structure is the conclusion of one and only 
one link; 
- every occurrence of a formula ia the structure is the premise of at most one link. 
2.2. Examples. What we have pedantically defined as a proof-structure corresponds 
to the rough idea of starting with the axiom links and then developing the proof in 
a tree-like way by using the @- and 79,rules. In articular, Fig. 2(a) and (b) are 
equally satisfactory as prcof-structures. One may imagine more pathological 
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examples, e.g., nonconnected proof-structures: 
A A’- BL B. 
(In the sequel, proof-nets will be connected.) 
We shall content ourselves with a graphical representation for proof-structures 
of the kind already used. Such a representation is rarely ambiguous and so easy to 
understand. Let us however recall that in an axiom link, the left formula is here for 
convenience (symmetry of the link), while in the two other types of link, left and 
right have a real meaning. We shall not define obvious notions such as being 
above/below a formula, or being connected. By the way, we have already started 
with our last abuse: we speak of a formula instead of an occurrence, any time this 
is not ambiguous. 
2.1. The concept of trip 
The problem is to determine which among the proof-structures are logically sound; 
such structures will be called nets. For this we shall define the concept of trip, which 
is better understood within a temporal imagery and the idea of something (a particle, 
information, etc.) travelling through the proof-structure. 
(i) The ‘time’ will be cyclic, discrete and finite. In general, the trips will be 
scheduled according to some Z/k& but the choice of the origin of time will be just 
a convention with no meaning. The problem with cyclic time is that ‘after’ and 
‘before’ are not defined globally. However, if t and u are two distinct times, the 
intend [t, u] makes sense: choose a determination r between 0 and k - 1 for u - t; 
then, [t, u] consists of the time moments t, t + 1,. . . , t + r = u. 
(ii) Each formula will be viewed as a box (see Fig. 3) in which our particle may 
travel. The idea is that the particle will enter A by the gate marked “A” and will 
Fig. 3. 
immediately go out through the gate marked “ “. These two operations are per- 
formed in the same unit A is used only for this purpose; i.e., at t” the 
particle 1~ in A between ” and nowhere else. The particle will re-enter 
(but there is no ‘before’, ” and will immediately go out through 
‘, all this at another moment t,. Now the particle exits through a gate with a 
ction; at the moment just after this exit, it will enter anot er formula by using 
s of the proof-structure. Sometimes, the trip can only be done in one way, 
but very often, there are several ways of continuing, and these ways are selected by 
switches. 
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(1) Axiom linbc: The picture in Fig. 4 is clear: immediately after exiting through 
, the particle enters Al immediately after exiting through gate A’- 
particle enters A In other terms, t(At) = t(A”)+ 1 and t(A,) = t(Al^)+ 1. 
Fig. 4. 
(2) Terminal formula: This is the case of a formula which is not a premise (see 
Fig. 5), i.e., just after exiting through A , the particle re-enters through Al. In other 
terms, ?(A^) = ?(A,)+ 1. 
Fig. 5. 
(3) Times link: Associated with such a link is a switch with two positions ‘“L” 
and “IV’. The switch is .-t on one of these two positions for the whole trip, 
independently of the positions of other switches. According to the position of the 
switch, the particle moves as shown in Fig. 6. 
(a) @G 
Fig. 6. (a) switch on “L”. (b) switch on “R”. 
ooking carefully, we see that the only difference between “L” and “IV is the 
interchange between A and B. ‘Ihe terminology “L” comes from the fact that we 
reach the conclusion (A@ B ) through the left premise (A ) when the switch is on 
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bb~9, The same reason 1s behind the terminology for the par link. 
“L”: t(B^)= t(AQB”)+l, t(A”) = t( B,) + 1, 
“R”: t(A^) = t(A@ B^) + 1, t( B”) = t(A,) + 1, 
(4) Par link (see Fig. 7): Associated with such a link is a switch with two positions 
“L” and “R”; here too, the switch is set once and for all for the trip, independently 
(4 (b) 
Fig. 7. (a) switch on ‘I”. (b) switch on 3“. 
from other switches. The two positions of the switch lead to symmetric travels of 
the particle. 
“L”: t(A^) = t(A ‘18 B)^ + 1, t(A %’ B,) = t(A,)+ 1, t(B^)=t(B,)+l; 
“R”: t(B”) = t(A ‘19 B)” + 1, t(A ?? B,) = t(A,)+ 1, t(A”) = t(A,) + 1. 
(iii) Everything is now ready for the trip, which can be made as follows: we set 
the switches of all par and times links on arbitrary positions (so there are 2” 
possibilities if n is the number of switches). We select an arbitrary formula A and 
an exit gate (A ) at time 0. Then there are clear, unambigous conditions to 
go on forever. Since the whole structure is finite, the trip is eventually periodic, but 
since the same remark can be made if one inverts the sense of time, this concretely 
forces the existence of a strictly positive integer k such that, at time k, the particle 
enters through the dual gate ( or AT respectively); the number k with this property 
can be chosen minimal and n we have obtained a trip parameterized by Z/kZ. 
NOW, two possibilities arise: 
(a) k < 2~9, where p is the number of formulas of the structure; the trip is called 
a shorttrip. 
(b) k = 2p, with p as above; the trip is called a longtrip. 
. Go back to the examples in Fig. 2 and, in both cases, set all switches 
. 2(a) we get a longtrip, namely, 
_L ih A 
VP 3 ) . . . . 
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Here, each formula his been passed in both senses. In Fig. 2(b), however, we get 
a typical shorttrip. These examples are enough to give some evidence for the 
following definition. 
nition. A proof-structure is said to be a proof-net when it admits no shorttrip. 
eformulatiou. We reformulate the definition of proof-net in mo 
A proof structure with p formulas and n switches is said to be a p 
for any position of the switches, there is a bijection t(.) between Z/ 
2p distinct exits of the structure such that, for any two exits e, e’, t( e’) = t(e) + 1 iff 
e’ comes immediately after e in the travel process that has been expose n full 
etails in the introduction of Section 2.1 (w.r.t. the positions of the s-wi es, of 
course). 
2.4. Remark. Checking that a proof-structure has no sh rttrip requires looking at 
2” different cases. This number can be decreased to 2”~‘: let (1) and (2) be two 
positions of the switches, (2) being obtained from (1) by commuting all @-switches 
to the other position. It is easily checked that (2) is the same as (1) but with time 
reversed and, in particular, it suffices to check only one of them. Anyway, the 
soundness condition is not feasible. However, it is not part of our intentions to 
check soundness by concrete means. The proof-nets we shall deal with in practice 
will all come from sequent calculus or will be obtained from other proof-nets by 
means of transitions preserving the soundness condition. Hence, the soundness 
cc ndition is an abstract notion (just like, say, semantic soundness), whose importance 
lies in its relation to linear sequent calculus. We shall now prove that proof-net.3 
are the ‘natural deduction of linear sequent calculus’. 
2.7, Theorem. Ij en is a proof in linear sequent calculus of I+ 1,.-‘-J% Wb=t* in 
the multiplicative fragment without cut), then we can natud?;) assodate with ?r Q 
proof-net n- whose terminal formulas are exacdy (orat occurrence of) j,.*.: (one 
occurrence of) A,,. 
roof. The proof-net 7r- is 
Case 1: 77 is an axiom t- 
which is a proof-net: there is no swi:ch. a d oiily one longtrip 
‘;, ALA, 
A ,.... 
Case 2: 7: is obtained from h by an exchange rule; take F = A-. 
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Case 3: rr is obtained from h by (18): 
cGL, c 
I-ATB,C’ 
By induction hypothesis, we have obtained A -, in which we can individualize A 




We have to prove the soundness of 6: Setting all switches on arbitrary positions 
in 6 and assuming that the switch of the new link is on, say ‘I”, we can start a 
trip at t = 0 and AA; since h- is sound, at time 212 - 1 (where n is the number of 
formulas of A-) we arrive at A,; then the trip is easily finished by adding 
A 38 B, 9 A T B” at times 2n, 2n + 1. We have obtained a longtrip, so V- is correct. 
Case 4: m is obtained from h and p by (a): 
By induction hypothesis, we have obtained h - and p-, in which we can respectively 
individualize A and IX 7~~ is obtained as follows: 
Again, set all switches of 6 for a trip, and let us say that the last switch is on “R”. 
Assume that there are n formulas in A-, m formulas in p-: starting with A” at time 
t = C: we arrive at A, at time t = 2n - P (soundness of A-); then, at time t = 2n, we 
move at BA and so, since p- is sound, we arrive at B, at time t = 2n +2m - 1. Then, 
at times 2n+2m and 2n +2m+ 1, we visit A@ B, and A@ B”, therefore ending a 
longtrip. Hence, IT- is sound. 0 
. The transformation 7r - 7r- l identifies proofs which differ by the order 
of rules. For instance, the proofs 
t--A, Al I-B, BL 
63 
t-A@ B, A*, B'- l-c, CL 
0 
resented by t?re same proof-met, 
converse of Theorem 2.7, namely that 
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AeB 
(Am BhaC ” 1 z-J-- 
Fig. 8. 
a proof-net can always be written as Y for an appropriate 7~ The difficulty is that 
several IZ’S are possible, and the converse is a very subtle result. 
2.9. Theorem. If p is a proof-net, one can jhd a proof g in sequent calculus such that 
P = F. 
roof. by induction on the number of links in p: 
(i) If p has exactly one link, then /? must be of the form A A’: in that case, 
the claim is proved by taking as rr the axiom t-A, Al. 
(ii) If p has more than one link, then one of these links must be a par or a times 
link (otherwise, p is not connected and it is immediate that, in a nonconnected 
proof-structure, all trips are short). Hence, there is a terminal formula which is the 
conclusion of a par or a times link. In this case, we state the hypothesis that one 




where p’ is the proof-structure obtained by restriction. p’ has one link less than /3. 
Furthermore, p’ is a proof-net: setting all switches for a trip in /3’, and setting the 
additional switch of p on “L”, we get a longtrip 
AA ,..., B,,B^ ,..., A,,A38B,,A%‘BA,AA ,... 
in /3. But this shows the existence of a longtrip 
AA ,..., B,,B^ ,..., A,,A” ,... 
in p’, and this established the soundness of p’. 
The induction hypothesis has built W’ such that C = p’. Then, for 7~ one can 
take the proof: 
(exchanges have not been indicated). 
(iii) IIn this case we assu , but that no ter 




where p’ and p” are disjoint subproof-nets of /3. Of course, we can try to make such 
a splitting for each terminal conclusion of a times link in /3 and in simple examples 
it turns out that if we choose the wrong terminal formula, then the splitting does 
not work. For instance, the proof-net in Fig. 9 has three terminal @-links but one 
Of 
at 
them (the one ending with AL@ Bl) cannot be split. The proof-net can be split 
the two other terminal inks, and the non-unicity of the solution of splitting 
problems makes it even more complicated. We shall now try to prove the existence 
of a splitting from which the last case of the theorem will easily follow. Let us 
remark however that the hypothesis ‘no terminal ‘I84ink is needed since the net in 






A9 B A IPB 
C D (AU) 
Fig. 9. 
Fig. 10. 
2. ma. Let fi be Q proof-net and consider ( w.r. t. a certain position of the 
switches) the respective times of passage of the particle through A,, A@ BA, B, , say 
tl , t2, t3, in a given @-link of p; then t2 E [t, , tJ. In other terms, in case “L”, the 
particle travels QS follows: 
and not as: 
t t3 E [t,, t2] and assume that the switch of 
runs as follows: 
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Now commute the switch to “ ” and observe that we get a shorttrip 
A@&,&,..., “,.... 
(The portions in dots in the original trip are common to both trips.) 0 
.2. mrna. Let p be a proof-net and consider ( w.r. t. a certain position of the 
switches) the respective times t 1, t2, t3 of passage of the particle through the gates 
A,, AA and B, of a given Wink; then t2 E [ tl , t3]. In other terms, in case ‘I”, the 
order of passage is 
and not: 
1 i kJ . 1 3 
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Lemma 2.9.1. Assume, for a contradiction, that 
t3 E [ tl, t2]. Then (if our T-switch is ‘on “L”), the trip runs as follows: 
A,,A??B V,..., B,,B^ ,..., A78B”,AA ,..., A,. 
Setting the switch on the position “R”, we get the shorttrip A^,. . . , A,, A”. 0 
2.9.3. Definition. Assume that w ’ IS a given O-link in a proof-net /3. We define 
the empires eA and eB of A and B as follows: eA consists of those formulas C such 
that, for any trip leaving AA at time tl and returning at A, at time t2 and passing 
through CA and C, at times u1 and u2, we have ul, u2 E [ tl, t2]. The empire eZ3 is 
defined in a symmetric way. 
2.9.4. Facts 
(i) A E eA. 
(ii) eAn eB=fl. 
(iii) ZfC E eA, and C is linked to C’- by C Cl, then C’E eA. 
E eA is the conclusion of a link && then C, DE 
E eA is the conclusion of a link w, then C, D E 
(vi) If &iF . 1s a @-link distinct from the Zink bB and if C E (respectively 
DE eA), then CODE 
(vii) Zf $i& is a kand C,DEeA, thenC%’ 
roof. (i): self-evident. 
y Lemma 2.9.1, the intervals 
are necessarily disjoint, etc. 
. . . 
( 1 ill : is is because t atea of C’ are crosse 
ates of C. 
ive 
(iv): Take a trip with the COD-switch on “‘L’?. Then, since C, and DA are 
passed at one step from CG D, and C@ DA, C, and DA belong to the interval 
AA , . . , A,. New;, imagine that the two consecutive times of D, 
and CA outside the interval . . . , A,: the interval B ^ , . . . , D, (or 
A@&,..., 0,) is performed without passing through any of the two links 4’ 
and && Now, let us commute the switch &# to “R”. It is immediate (for 
reasons of symmetry) that D, belongs to the interval AA,. . . , A, of this new trip. 
However, the part in dots BA, . . . , D, (or A@ B,, . . . , 0,) is common to both trips, 
and does not contain A; a contradiction. We arrive at the conclusion that the four 
exits of C and D are passed between AA and A,. 
(v): Assume that the switch of our V-link is on “L”. Then the times of passage 
through C, and CA being one step from the times of passage through C 0 D, and 
CO DA, it follows that C, , CA E AA, . . . , A,. Now, assume that the consecutive 
times of passage through D, and DA are outside the interval AA,. . . , A,. Then we 
conclude that the interval BA, . . . , 0, (or A 79 B, , . . . , 0,) is performed without 
passing through the links wand w. Form another trip by setting our &witch 
to “IV’ and derive a contradiction as in (iii). 
(vi): Consider a trip with the switch && on “L”. Then, by hypothesis, the 
times of passage through C, and CA are within the interval AA,. . . , A,. We have 
the following possibilities, using Lemma 2.9.1: 
AA ,..., C,,COD, ,..., CODA,DA,...,D,,CA,-..,A,, 
AA ,..., c@DA,DA ,..., o,,C^,...,C,,COD,,...,A,, 
AA ,..., D,,C^ ,..., C,.COD,,...,CODA,DA,...,Av. 
There is no other possibility since A,, . . . , !7,. . . , AA and A,, . . . , CO DA,. . . , AA 
are easily refuted by commuting our switch to ‘X”. From this we get the result. 
(vii): Consider a trip (with our ?&switch on “L”). Then, by Lemma 2.9.2, the 
order is as follows: 
CA ,..., D,,D^ ,..., C,,CVD “,..., C38DA,CA 
and we still have to determine the respective places of AA and A, in this pattern. 
If AA is between C tB D, and C 19 DA, then the only way to ensure that C E eA is 
to have 
A.,..., C78D”,C” ,..., C,,C??D “,..., A “,..., 
i.e., A, is also in the same interval. If AA is between CA and D,, then the only way 
to have C E eA is 
.? 
s*.*9 vY**-s C v9**-0 C" ,..., A,,..., 
i.e., A, is also in the same interval. Using 
V that v is also in the 
e two exits of C etween AA and _?,. L9 
these three cases, 
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23.5. Tf33lrem (Trip Theorem). 77rere is a o&ion ofthe swjtches such that eA is 
exactly the interval A”, . . . , .A y - 
roof. Each time there is a Wink co l c D D wrth exactly one premise in eA, set ik 
corresponding switch to “R” if C E eA and to “L” if DE eA. The other switches 
are set arbitrarily. Now we start our trip with AA, i.e., with an element of eA, and 
we check that we stay in eA up to the point A,: this can be easily proved by 
induction since the only way to exit eA would be going from a premise to a conclusion 
in a T-link. In that case, however, only one premise is in eA and the switches have 
been set such as to move backwards, i.e., to pass from E, to EA and thus to stay 
in eA. So the whole portion betwen AA and A, is in eA and since it contains eA, 
we are done. Cl 
2.9.6. Corollary. If CO D is ‘above’ A, i.e., is an hereditary premise of A, and if 
C @ D is the conclusion of a @-link hD, then eC v eD c eA. 
Proof. Set the switches so that eA is performed between AA and A,; since all 
formulas ‘above’ A belong to eA, we are free to set the switches so that, after AA, 
the particle goes from conclusion to premise up to DA. Then the trip can be visualized 
as 
. . . , AA 9***9 DA ,..., D “,..., A “,.... 
From this, eDc DA,. . . , D, c AA,. . . , A, = eA. For similar reasons, eC c eA. Cl 
2.9.7. Theorem (Splitting Theorem). Let p be a proof-net with at Ieast one terminal 
@-link and no terminal Wink Then it is possible tojnd a terminal O-link bB such 
that p is the union of eA, eB, and of the formula A@ B. 
Proof. Choose a link w such that eA u eB is maximal w.r.t. inclusion. If A@ B 
is not terminal, then below A@ B there is a terminal link and, by hypothesis, this 
link must be of the form $=J& (Say that, for instance, A@ B is above D.) Then, 
by Corollary 2.9.6, eA u eB c eD, contradicting the assumption of maximality. Now, 
assume, for a contradiction, that eA u eB u {A@ B} # B. Then we claim the existence 
of a link && with either C E eA and DE eB, or C E e 
exists because, otherwise, by setting the switches as we did in the proof of the Trip 
Theorem 2.9.5, we can simultaneously realize eA = AA, . . . , A, and e 
In the remaining two steps, the particle is in so p=eAve 
contradiction. 
Now the formula C ?? D is above a terminal @-link w and we may assume 
is indeed above, say F. Set the s 
it has already been ob 
as we want above 
up to CA: in particular, our P-switch is on “L”. Now the trip looks as follows (using 
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Lemma 2.9.2) 
. . . , FA ,..., C78DA,C” ,..., D,,D^ ,..., C,,CVD “,..., F “,.... 
Using the fact that D E e and C E eA, the only room for B” in t 
between C” and D,; the only possible room for B, in this picture is between D” 
and C,. But this shows that eB c eF. By interchanging C and D, we obtain that 
eAc eF. But then eA u eB cannot be maximal any longer. We have therefore 
contradicted the assumption eA v eB v {A@ B} # p. Cl 
f of Theorem 2.9 (continued). The remaining case is just the case where Theorem 
2.9.7 applies, so choose a terminal link w with the splitting property. We claim 
that, once the terminal link has been removed, the subsets eA and eB are not linked 
together. The only possible linkage would be through a V-link &$ with one 
premise in eA and the other in eB, but then C 18 D would be nowhere. So it makes 
sense to speak of the respective r strictions p’ and /3” of p to eA and eB respectively. 
The fact that /3’ and /3” are in turn proof-nets i a trifle compared with the complexity 
of the proof of the Splitting Theorem and is therefore omitted! If we associate, 
using the induction hypothesis, with p’ and /3” proofs V’ and w” in linear sequent 
calculus of t-A, C and + B, D respectively such that 7r’- = p’ and 6 = p”, then we 
can define 7~ as 
and, clearly, 6 = p. Cl 
2.2. The cut-rule 
The cut-rule has been omitted because, geometrically 
the O-rule. The cut-rule can be written as a link 
speaking, it is very close to 
A A’ 
with two premises and no conclusion. Trips through this link proceed in the obvious 
way: after A, go to Al”, after A$ go to A”. Now this is (up to inessentiai details) 
as if one were working with a link 
A A’ 
AQA’ 
with A@ A-‘ terminal (the position of the corresponding switch does not matter). 
e decide to write the cut-rule as 
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where CUT is a symbol (not a formula) which is used so that the cut-rule looks 
formally like a O-link, the only difference being that since CUT is not a formula, 
CUT is necessarily terminal. Then this link is treated exactly as a @-link and our 
main theorem immediately extends to the calculus with cv’. In particular, the 
phenomenon of splitting (Theorem 2.9.7) involves either a O-link of a CUT-link. 
2.3. Cut-elimination 
Take p, a proof-net in the multiplicative fragment with cut and select a particular 
CUT-link w. We define a contractum p’ of /3 (w.r.t. this particular link) as 
follows: 
(i) If A and A* are the respective conclusions of dual multiplicative links, i.e., 
if p ends with 
. . . . 
. . . . 
; ;: ;A + 
BmC B’ m’- C’- 
CUT 







CUT CUT ’ 
(ii) If A is the conclusion of an axiom-link, i.e., p ends with 
. 
. CUT . 
unify the two occurrences of AL so that one gets 
. 
(iii) If A-‘* is the conclusion of an axiom-link, we define /3’ symmetrically. When 
both A and Al are conclusions of axiom-links, i.e., in the situation 




then we have a conflict 
A’- A 
. l . 
I . 
. . 
between (ii) and (iii). owever, both cases lead to 
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roposition. ( 1) If p is a proof-net and p’ is a contractum of /3, then p’ is a 
proof-net. 
(2) p’ is strictly smaller than p, i.e., has strictl_y less formulas. 
roof. We prove (2) first, then (1). 
(2): The size s(p) of a proof-net is the number of formulas of p including the 
symbol CUT. The inclusion of these cut-symbols is the most elegant solution. In 
case (i) the size is diminished by 1; in cases (ii) and (iii) it is diminished by three 
units. There is however a hidden trap in this apparently trivial proof: when A is 
the conclusion of an axiom-link, who tells us that the two occurrences of AL are 
distinct ? In fact, they can be the same if /3 is the proof-structure 
CUT 
in which case p’ is p. But this particular proof-structure is obviously not a proof-net 
since it has a shorttrip. This shows the extreme importance of being a proof-net. 
(1): Assume th a we are in case (i) (cases (ii) and (iii) are immediate) and that t 
the multiplicative m is 0. Set the switches of p’ for a trip. This induces a switching 
of 6 (our two multiplicative links being switched on “L”). Then the trip works as 
foilows (cf. Lemmas 2.9.1 and 2.9.2): 
B,,B@C,,BL78CLn,BLn ,..., C&C”‘,..., B:,BL78C;, 
B@C^,C^ ,..., C,,B^ ,..., B,. 
I-Ience, in /3’, the particle travels as follows: 
B,,BI” ,... $&CA ,..., C,,C’“,...,~~,B^,...,B, 
which is a longtrip. 0 
osition. Say that p reduces to p’ (notation: p red p’) when /3’ is a hereditary 
contractum of fi. Then, reduction satis$es the Church- Rosser property. 
Essentially, this proposition says that if we contract two distinct cuts of /3, 
then the result does not depend on the order of application of the contractions. 
This is practically immediate. 0 
(Strong Normalization). A proof-net of size n normalizes into a cut-free 
proof-net in less than n steps; the result, which does not depend on the order of 
application of the contractions, is called the normal form of our proof-net. 
e theorem suggest a sequential procedure for the 
, of course, more natural to think of a parallel procedure, 
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namely to work independently on each CUT. One of the astounding properties of 
the multiplicative fragment is that everything works perfectly well, i.e., that there 
is not the slightest problem of synchronization. 
The problem is now to extend the theory of proof-nets to the full language. At 
the present moment (September 1986) there is no extant extension of the same 
quality as what exists for the multiplicative fragment. Moreover, we doubt that 
anything really convincing might ever be done for the additives. For the rest of 
the language, what we present below can surely be improved.. . . 
The general pattern we shall now introduce is that of a proof-box. Roughly 
speaking, proof-boxes are synchronization marks in the proof-net. They can also 
be seen as moments where we restore the sequent (i.e., the sequential!) structure. 
Their use is therefore a bridle to parallelism and, for that reason, one must try to 
limit their use. In particular, reasonable improvements of the concept of proof-net 
showing that some rules can be written without boxes will be of great practical 
interest (however, we believe that (&) cannot be written without boxes j. 
How to make a box depends on the particular syntax, the particular rules we 
want to express, and is of no interest right now. What concerns us now is how to 
use a box. When made, a box looks as shown in Fig. 11, i.e., a black ‘thing’ with 
Fig. 11. 
n outputs/inputs, n f 0. What is inside the square is the building process of the 
box, which is irrelevant: boxes are treated in a perfectly modular way: we can use 
the box lE3 in /3 without knowing its contents, i.e., another box B’ with exactly the 
same n doors A l,. . . , A, would do as well. This is the principle of the black box: 
in order to check the correctness of a proof-net involving a box IEB, we have to check 
tile proof-net without knowing anything about IFB and check B itself. Now, what is 
the criterion for the correctness of a proof-net involving a box B? Simply, the box 
is treated as any potential proof-net with conclusions Al, . . . , A,. 
The multiplicative fragment with proof-boxes admits, besides the 
links already acknowledged, a new kind of link shown in Fig. 12, where 
are arbitrary formulas and n # 0. With such a box is associated a switch 
of the switch consists in a permutation of n which is cyclic, i.e., 1, a( I), cr’( l), l . . , 
0 
n-l (1) are all distinct. The trip is executed as follows: after 
Theorems 2.7 and 2.9 can be extended to the calculus with boxes; the 
Fig. 12. 
us4 of a proof-box with doors A,, . . . , A, in a proof-net corresponds to the use of the 
axiom I-A1,...,A,. 
roof. The extension of the results to this new context offers no difficulty. In fact, 
proof-boxes have more or less the same structure as the logical axiom A AL. For 
instance, let us look at the analogue of Fact 2.9.4(iii): if one door Ak of III belongs 
to eA, then any other door Al of B does so too. (Roof: First observe that a trip is 
performed by putting together slices Ai,, . . . , Al becallt;c if Qutside the box one 
could have something like Ai,, . . . , AT with j # i, theA, by appropriately choosing 
c (a(j) = i), one would get the shorttrip Ai,, . . . 9 44Tp J&,, . Now, if AA and A, are 
located in Ai,,...,AF and Aj,,... , AT l.espectiT. s”ly, we claim that i = j; suppose 
otherwise, then take a(i) = j: the two doors of Ak are not in Ai,, . . . , AT. Enally, 
the only possible location of AA and & within Ai,, . . . , A; is 
AiV,...,AV,...,AA,... , A: and from this, we easily conclude that all the doors 
of B are in eA.) Apart from this analogue, there is very little novelty in this 
generalization. 0 
2.4. 7&e system PlVl 
The system PNl is a proof-net system for linear propositional calculus based on 
the idea of putting all contextual rules (i.e., rules which in sequent calculus depend 
on the context in sequent calculus) into proof-boxes without trying to limit the 
number of boxes. Besides boxes and the multiplicative links, there will be a certain 
number of links corresponding to unary rules 
A -. 
B’ 
such links are so harmless (trip: from A, go to B,, from BA go to AA) that they 
practically do not alter the multiplicative paradise, 
xioms: 
logical axiom, 
axiom for T, 
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Technically speaking, these three axioms are boxes, in which we distinguish front 
doors (A and A’ in the logical axiom, in the axiom for , T in the last case), and 

















Box formation: From proof-nets fl’ and p” whose respective conclusions (CUT is 
not counted) are A, C and B, C, we form a box whose conclusions are A & B, 
(see Fig. 13: front door: A & B; auxiliary door: C). 
v - 
c4 
/ \ / 
l-_ -
\ 






'C -/A I \C- B” 
c- A&B- 
Fig. 13. 
From a proof-net p with conclusions C (CUT is not counted), we form a box 
with conclusion C, 1 (respectively C, ?A) (see Fig. 14: front door: 1 (respectively 









From a proof-net /3 whose conclusions (CUT is not counted) are 
a box whose conclusions are !A, ? (see Fig. 15: front do 
We recall that, geometrically speaking, 
that rule (C?) behaves like (5’). It is not 
4 It is convenient o consider the CUT link symmetric, i.e., there is no ‘left’ or ‘right’ in the rule as 
in the logical axiom. 
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.B-!A- - 
Fig. 15. 
logic within this system, the only remark to make being that the rule ( W?) is now 
done with the logical axioms. The fact that this translation is faithful offers no 
difficulty. 
2.5. 772e system PN2 
We finally direct our attention to the predicate case. Here, however, we make a 
different syntactic choice, moving from first-order to second-order. It was natural 
to deal with first-order linear logic to get a completeness theorem as obtained in 
Section I. Already at that moment we did not spend too much time with the 
quantifiers! As the paper continues it focuses more and more on computational 
aspects, so it is more and more interesting to consider second-order logic in the 
spirit of the system F of [ 11. So we shall develop here the system PN2 of second-order 
propositional logic. First-order quantifiers will from now on disappear from our 
world. The reader who would like to consider second-order predicate calculus would 
not encounter the slightest problem, just as the results on F were immediately 
transferable to Takeuti’s system. Second-order propositional logic (linear version) 
is obtained by considering propositional variables a, b, c, . . . (instead of arbitrary 
constants) together with the quantifiers //a. and Va.. The crucial concept is that of 
substitution of a proposition B for a propositional variable a in A, denoted A[ B/a]: 
Replace all occurrences of a by B, all occurrences of al by BL. In terms of sequent 
calculus, the rules for second-order quantification can be written as 
A 
c 
+Aa.A, b ’ t-Va.A, C V ’ 
In (A), there is the familiar restriction: a not free in 
The rules for quantifiers are handled as follows: 
- on the one hand, the unary link 
AiN 4 
Va.A ” 
land, the box-formation scheme: from roof-net p whose con- 
A are such that a does not occur free in we form a box whose 
N2 have already been introduced; 
of PNl concerned with the multiplicative fragment only including 
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cut. PNO- is the cut-fret art of PNO; similarly, PNI - and P 2 are the cut-free 
parts of PNl and PN2. 
2.6. Discussion 
Here we shall shortly discuss the possibility of improving the syntax by removin 
or tranforming some boxes. 
(i) The box for ! is an absolute one; later on, we shall write no contraction rules 
making this scheme commute with others. Hence, the box, viewed as an interruption 
of the linear features, should not be touched. Even if, by some sort of miracle, it 
were possible to erase such boxes, this would mean that one can reconstruct hem 
in a unique way, so why not directly note them? 
(ii) The boxes for weakening seem of very limited interest. The problem is that 
if we admit configurations like 
then we are forced to accept certain shorttrips from which endless complications 
start. However, the only kind of shorttrip that is definitely bad is the one including 
only one gate for a formula, e.g. A* but not A,, and the inclusion of unboxed 
weakening would not introduce these bad boxes. A nice criterion for soundness for 
this variant is however not yet known. 
(iii) The box for A seems removable too; th, J -* *ame comments hold as in the case 
of the weakening boxes. 
(iv) Finally, the case of &-boxes is the most delicate; when we contract such 
boxes, there is a phenomenon of duplication, and removing the boxes would mean 
that we have a way to write the two boxes in Fig. 17 as the same proof-net. This 
goal seems out of reach. However, see Section 6 for what could be a solution by 
means of families of proof-structures. 
Fig. 17. 
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e coherent sema 
In Section 1, we developed the semantics of linear logic in the Tarskian style, 
i.e., by explaining the formulas. But there is another semantic tradition, amounting 
eyting’s semantics of proofs, which consists in modelling the proofs themselves. 
In this tradition, proofs are considered as functions, relations, etc. on some kind 
of constructive space, which has often been viewed as Scott domains. In previous 
work, we have simplified Scott domains in order to get what we called qualitative 
domains. The binary ones, rebaptized coherent spaces, will form the core of our 
semantics of proofs. 
&&ion. A coherent space X is a set satisfying the following conditions: 
(i) aEXAbca_bEX. 
(ii) Say that a, b E X are compatible w.r.t. X when a v b E X; then, if A is any 
subset of X formed of pairwise compatible elements, we have UA E X. In particular, 
OEX. 
ition. Assume that X is a coherent space. The web of X, W(X) is a 
unoriented graph, defined by 
domain 1x1 of the graph is UX = {z ; (z} E X}; 
(ii) the linkage relation (coherence modulo X) is defined as follows: 
x~y [mod X] iff {x, y} E X. 
3. sition. The map associating to any coherent space X its web W(X) is a 
bijection between coherent spaces and reflexive unoriented graphs. The graph may be 
recovered from its web by means of the formula 
aeX 5) acIX)AVx,yEa: xCy[modX]. 
ore or less immediate. U 
. In general, the webs stay denumerabie and effective, whereas the 
spaces have the power of the continuum. So, most of the time we deal with webs. 
Instead of coherence, it is sometimes more convenient to consider strict coherence: 
] iff xCy [mod X] and x # y. 
e following relations are also of interest: 
_ strict incoherence: x-y od X] iff l(xCy [mod Xl); 
- incoherence: XS=ZY [mod iff ~(x^y[modX]). 
attention to the two following points: 
Linear logic 49 
(3 - is not a connective of linear logic; in particular, it is strictly stronger than 
0-0. In fact, it would be easy to define a coherent semantics for something like -, 
but we would get problems in other stages, i.e., the phase semantics and the 
proof-nets. 
(ii) Some canonical isomorphisms are omitted: this is because coherent spaces 
do not catch all of linear logic: typically, and 1 are the same coherent space for 
stupid reasons, but their equivalence (translated as 0-0 I) is not provable. So, 
writing the isomorphisms would have been misleading. 
3.5. Definition (linear negation ). If x PS a coherent space, its linear negation X-‘ 
is defined by 
WI = WI, 
xsy [mod X’] iff x,“y [mod X]. 
In other terms, the operation nil exchanges coherence and incoherence. We clearly 
have X** = X, i.e., nil is involutive. The existence of a constructive involution is a 
tremendous improvement on intuitionistic logic. As we shall proceed with the other 
connectives, it will be our first task to check the De Morgan equalities, which will 
justify, at the level of the coherent semantics, the restriction of nil to atoms. 
3.6. Definition (multiplicatives). The name itself comes from the coherent semantics: 
the three multiplicatives are variations on the theme of the Cartesian product: 
IXOYI=IX1& YI=JX- YI=IXlxlYI, 
(x, y)C(x’, y’) [mod X0 Y] iff XCX’ [mod X] and yCy’ [mod Y], 
(x, y)-(d) y’) [mod X 79 Y] iff x-x’ [mod X] or y-y’ (mod Y], 
k y)cW, y’) [mod X - Y] iff (x-x’ [mod X]+y-y’ [mod Y]) and 
(x=x’ [mod X]+yCy’ [mod Y]). 
Observe that 0 is defined in terms of C, whereas ?!? is defined in terms of -, and 
-4 is defined in term; of preservation properties, which is in the spirit of an 
implication, linear or not. 
The De Morgan equalities are easily verifiled: 
(X0 Y)” = XL 79 Yl, (X ‘I;B Y)‘=: X’@ VI, 
The commutativity of the multiplicatives isI expressed by 
The associativity of the multiplicatives is ex 
@( Y@Z)-(X@ Y)@Z, X??(Y?Kz)-(XV Y)Vz, 
x-0(Y-Z)-(XOY)-z, x-0(Y??Z)-(X- Y)Tz. 
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ition (the unit coherent space). Up to isomorphism, there is exactly one 
pace whose web consists of one point, say 1. In particular, this space is 
equal to its linear negation. The space will be indifferently denoted 
will stand as the interpretation of these constants. We write the isomorphism 
expressing the neutrality of the unit space, choosing between the two notations 
and I the one which has also a logical meaning: 
x01-x, x181-x, l-X-X, X-I-XI. 
3. nition (the additives). Here too the name comes from the coherent seman- 
tics: the two additives are variations on the theme of the direct sum: 
IX& YJ=~xoYJ=~x~+~Y~={o}x~x)u{l}x~YJ, 
(0, x)=(0, x’) [mod X & Y] or [mod X0 Y] iff x=x’ [mod X], 
(1, y)S(l, y’) [mod X & Y] or [mod X0 Y] iff ySy’ [mod Y], 
(0, x)^( 1, y) [mod X & Y] for all x E 1x1 and y E I YI, 
(0, x)~(J, y) [mod X0 Y] for all x E 1x1 and y E I Y(. 
X and Y have been recopied as if they were in the direct sum; now there are only 
two good-taste solutions as to coherence between _X Tnd Yr either always “yes” 
(&) or always “no” (0). 
The De Morgan equalities are immediate: 
(X& Y)” = X’@ YL, (X0 Y)‘= XL & Y-t 
The commututivity of the additives is expressed by 
X&Y-Y&X, XOY-YOX. 
The associutivity of the additives is expressed by 
X&(Y&Z)-(Xc% Y)&Z, X0( YOZ)-(X0 Y)Oz. 
The dis?tibutivity of the multiplicatives w.r.t. the additives is expressed by 
X0( YOZ)-(X0 Y)@(X@Z), 
X?B(Y&Z)-(X& Y)%yX&Z), 
x-(Y&Z)-(X-0 Y)&(X-Z), 
The semi-distributivity of the multiplicatives w.r.t. the additives is the fact that 
between X@( Y & 2) and (X0 Y) &(X02), 
38 Y)O(X%%?) and XT?(YBZ:), 
)0(X - Z) and X - (Y&Z), 
etween (
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it is possible to construct a bijective mapping from the web of the left-hand space 
to the web of the right-hand space, preserving coherence. In general, these maps 
are not isomorphisms. 
(the null coherent space). This space has a void web. We shall denote 
it by 0 or T, with the same hidden intentions as in the case of the unit coherent 
space: the neutrality of the void space w.r.t. additives is expressed by 
The fact that they absorb multiplicatives is expressed by 
x00-0, XTT-T, O-OX-T, X-~T-T. 
3.10. Definition (the exponentials) . 
1 !X( = {a ; a E X and a finite}, aCb [mod !X] iff a v b E X, 
]?Xl = {a ; a E X’ and a finite}, a-b [mod ?X] iff a v be Xi. 
The De Morgan formulas are immediate: 
(!X)’ = ?(X’), (?X)‘= !(X’). 
The distributioity isomorphisms are 
!(X& Y)-(!X)O(!Y) 9 ?(XO Y) - (?X) 79 (?Y). 
The following can be taken as definitions of 1 and I: 
!T-1, ?O-1. 
We now have to deal with quantifiers. First-order quantifiers have a boring 
coherent semantics; hence, we concentrate on second-order propositional quan- 
tifiers, which will be handled by means of the category-theoretic methods introduced 
in [S] which we quickly recall in the following items (i)-(v): 
(i) Coherent spaces form a category COH by taking as morphisms from X to 
Y the set COH(X, Y) of all injective functions from 1x1 to I YI such that 
Vx, YE 1x1 xcy [mod X] c) f(x)cf(y) [mod Y]. 
Associated with such a morphism are two (linear) maps: 
f’from X to Y:f+(a)={f(z);zEa}, 
f- from Y to X: f-(b)=(z;f(z)E b}. 
(ii) Now, if A[q, . . . , cu,3 is a formula of second-order propositional calculus, 
we can define an associated functor (denoted A[X, , . . . 9 1, ACfi, l l l ,fnl) from 
IS one of the constants 
already described in efinitions 3.7 or 3. 
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(2) when A is the propositional variable (Y~, then A[ I= xi and A[S 1 =h; 
(3) when A is &, then A[ X] = Xf 
(4) when A is BOC, then 
wYl(~), crf l(Y )); 
(5) when A is B 78 C, then A[ 1 and A[f](x,y) = 
(B[f lb), C[f l(Y )); 
(6) when A is B & C, then A[X] = B[X] & C[X] and 
A[f I@, XI = (0, Nfl(xh Nf IO, Y) = (1, C[f I(y)); 
(7) when A is BO C, then A[XJ = B[X]@ C[X] and 
Nf IW, x) = (0, WlW), 4f IU, Y) = (1, C[f l(v)); 
(8) when A is !B, then A[W = !B[X] and A[f](a) = B[f]*(a); 
(9) when A is ?B, then A[X] = ?B[X] and A[f](a) = B[f]‘(a). 
The definition of A[ when A is of the form l\p.B or V&B will be given soon. 
For the definition of f ] in both cases, we have to define A[ f ]( X0, z) = (XL, z’), 
where X6 and z’ are obtained as follows: Let y = B[g, f](z) where g is the identity 
of X0; then, -N.r.t. the functor A[., Y] (f e COH(X, Y)), y has a normal form 
y = A[h, id&‘) for a suitable X& a suitable h E COH(X,, Xh) and a suitable z’ 
such that (X& z’) is in the trace of A[ ., Y]. 
(iii) The functors defined in that way preserve 
- direct limits, 
- pull-backs. 
Unfortunately, preservation of kernels is lost when dealing with exponentials and 
this is one of the reasons for looking for variants of the exponentials. 
(iv) For such functorc, we have a Normal Form ?%eorem [ 5, Theorem 1.31: let 
F be a functor from COH to COH preserving direct limits and pull-backs; if 
z E IF(X then it is possible to find a finite coherent space Xr, together with an 
fcCOH(X,, X) and a zoe IF( such that 
(1) zE FCf )(zo); 
(2) if YgECO X) and z1 E 1 F( Y)I are such that z = F(g)( z,), then there is 
a unique i2 E COH Y) such that z = F(g)(z,) and f = gh. 
(v) A trace of F is a set T such that 
(1) the elements of T are pairs (X, z), with X finite coherent space and z E I F( 
(2) given any coherent space Y and any y E I F( Y)l, there is a unique (X, z) E Tr( F) 
and a morphismfE COH(X, Y) such that y = F(f)(z). One uses the notation Tr( F) 
to denote an arbitrary trace of F, chosen once and for all; the actual choice of the 
trace does not matter. 
(the guantijers). Assume that is a functor from CO 
rther, (X, z)G( X’, z’) [mod /jF] 
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iff, for all Y, for all f E CO (X, Y) and f’~ COH( ‘, Y): F(f )(z)CF(f’)(z’) 
[mod F(Y)]. 
(2) IvFl consists of those (X, z) in Tr( F) such that, for all Y and all fi 9 fi in 
COH(X, Y): F(f,)(z)XF(f,)(z) [mod F(Y)]. Further, (X, 2)=(X’, z’) [mod VF] 
iff for some Y, for some f e COH(X, Y) and fly COH(X’, Y): F(f )(z)CF(f’)(z) 
[mod F(Y)]. 
. (i) ,dP.A[& ] and Vp.A[p, ] are defined as respectively, AF 
and V F, where F is the functor A[., 
(ii) The quantifiers involved in Definition 3.11 can be bounded. This was indeed 
shown in [S], and binary qualitative domains (now called coherent spaces) were 
introduced just to ensure that. 
(iii) Computations made in the same paper show that 
A a.a! =o, A t2.a - a! - 1. 
(In fact, it is shown that Acu.cu *Q’ - 1, from which we easily get Acr.a - a! - 
(iv) The interpretation of existence is a pure De-Morganization; in particular, 
IV F( has an unexpected efinition which has deep consequences, and is presumably 
far from being -well understood. 
3.13. Example (some isomorphisms). Among the many isomorphisms involving 
quantifiers, let us mention: 
(1) the De Morgan equalities: 
(Aa.A)‘= VCY.AI, (Va.A)l= Aa.AL; 
(2) the distributivity formulas: 
Acu.(A[ar] T B) - (Aar.A[a]) 79 B, Vcy.(A[c~]@ B) - (Va.A[a])OB, 
Ad&l -0 B) - W.A[a]) - B, l\a.(A --o Bra]) -A --o /ja.B[a]; 
(3) the associativity formulas: 
, ,d”;cx] & B) - (I\a.A) & B, Va.(A[a]@ B) - (b.Ab])@B; 
etc. To rememoer them, recall that A and V are to some extent generalized additives, 
and that A looks like &, V looks like 0. 
Our next goal is to define the semantics of the proofs of second-order linear 
propositional logic. For this, it is simpler to stay with sequents in order to avoid 
combining the novelty of the semantics with the novelty of the syntax! 
to be made out of closed propositions; if not, substitute for 
th(: free propositions of arbitrary coherent spaces. This means that we are in fact 
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working with additional constants, namely X for each coherent space X; but this 
is enough for these trifles. 
(2) We shall identify a formula with its associated coherent space; a convention 
that saves boring extra symbols like *, etc. 
(3) I-Iowever, we use * for the interpretation of rr; hence, V* is an object of the 
coherent space that would interpret the par of the sequence . In other terms, n* 
will be made of sequences z E A. By this we mean, in case A is Al,. . . , A,, that z 
is of the form zl,. . . , z,,, and z1 E A,, . . . , z, E A,,. Strict coherence modulo is 
defined by 
2”~’ [mod A] iff Zi -2: [mod Ai] for some i. 
Of course, one has to check that the subsets V* are made of pairwise coherent 
elements. (For readability, we add a symbol t- in front of the sequences z.) 
3.15. nitisn. r* is defined by induction on the proof v of t-A. We simul- 
taneously check the coherence of n* modulo A. 
(i) If 4p is the axiom i-i3, I?, then ,z* = {!-z, z ; z E I-RI). Observe that when z # 2’: 
either z-z’ [mod B] or Z-Z’ lmod Pl. 
(ii) If 7r is obtained from i’ and ?r”by the cut-rule 
then #’ = {kz’, 2”; 3y E IBI (ky, z’ E at’* and t-y, Z”E 7#‘*)}. To show the compatibility 
of two different points I-Z’, z” and t-t’, t” of v*, assume that y, x are such that t-y, t’ 
and FX, t’c d*, and t-y, z’ and I-X, t’ E d’*. Then, either yxx [mod B] or 
y~x [mod B-‘]. In the first case, t-z’- +z’[mod C]; in the other one, 
1; and in both cases, t-z’, t’” t-z’, t” [mod C, D]. 
rtant semantic feature of the cut-rule is the existential quantifier 
in front of the interpretation. Observe that this quantifier has a very unexpected 
feature: the unicity of y. (Proof: Assume that t-y, z’ and +x, z’ E v’*, and that t-y, z’ 
and t-x, z” E ?r”*; necessarily, ycx [mod B] and ySx [mod BL] and necessarily, 
y=x.) 
i) If 7r is obtained from V’ by the exchange rule replacing A by a permutation 
, then rr*={~-U(Z);+ZE 
(iv) If = is the axiom t-T, 
(v) If v is obtained from V’ and 7~” by (&): 
then V* - {I+, a), z’;t-a, z’ E m’*) u {I-( 1, b), z”;+b, Z” E n”“Z. 
r is obtained from w’ by (IO), then V* = {k(o, a), ~‘;+a, Z’E fl’*)* 
from r’ by (20), them rrsI: = {+(l, a), t’;t-a, 5% n’*). 
, then # consists of one point, namely l-1. 
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(ix) If w comes from W’ by the weakening rule (I): 
I- 
then W* = (t-1, Z;I-z E w’*). 
(x) If v comes from V’ and P” by (0): 
then TP = {k-(2’, z”), t’, t”; l-z’, t’E d* and i-z”, t” E 7~‘~‘). Assume that F-( z’, p”’ &’ J’ L /,L,L 
and t-(x’, x’), w’, W’ are two distinct points (u and v) or W* so that, for instance, 
t-z’, t’ # I-X’, w’; then, 
- either t’” w’ [mod C] in which case u and v are coherent, 
- or t’4(w’ [mod C] in which case S-x [mod A]. 
Now, if z”= x’, we get the coherence of (z’, z”) with (x’, x’), from which u and v 
are coherent; hence, we can assume that +z”, f” # t-x”, w’, in which case we have 
either t”” w” [mod D] and u and v are coherent, 
or t%w [mod D] and so, z “-2 [mod B]; but then, (z’, z”)-( x’, x’) [mod 
A@B] and once more II and v are coherent. 
(xi) If w comes from rr’ by (18): 
I-A, B, C 
I-A 39 I?, C’ 
then W* = {t-(x, y ), z ; I-X, y, z E w’*}. In this case, there is practically nothing to verify. 
(xii) If v is obtained from CCT’ by weakening rule ( W?): 
I-B 
b?A, B’ 
then # = {l--0,2 ; t-2 E IT’*}. 
(xiii) If 72 is obtained from V’ by the dereliction rule (D?): 
I-A, B 
then # = {t-{ a}, z ; t-a, z E w’*). 
(xiv) If 7r is obtained from W’ by the contraction rule (C?): 
t- ?A, ?A, 
then # = {t-a u b, z ; t-a, 6, z E 7t’* and a u 6 E A’}. The coherence of V* is practi- 
cally immediate. 
(xv) If w is obtained from W’ by the rule (!): 
t-A, ? 
then g* is the set of all sequences of the form +(x1, . c . , _x,), z; LJ . l . 1-J z, such that 
(1) {X19=*m,XnlEA9 
(2) for i = 1, . . . , n, +Xi, Zi E ?r’*, 
(3) Gum l .UZnEB1 
(By the way, x1, . . . , x, are necessarily distinct: if x1 = x2, then z1 u z2 E 
fact that the +Xi, Zi’S are coherent shows that z1 = z2, in which case we have a useless 
repetition.) 
The coherence of two elements u = {x,, . . . , xn}, z1 u . . . u z,, and u = 
{Y I,--*, Ylnh t1 u . l l u t,,, is shown as follows: assume u # u; 
- if {x, ,...,x”,Yl,.=., ym} E A, then u and u are coherent; 
- otherwise, one Xi (say x1) is incoherent with one yi (say yl). But t-x,, z1 and 
t-y,, tl are coherent; hence, z1 9, [mod ?B]; this shows that z1 u l l l u z,,^tt u 
l l l u fm [mod ?B] and u and u are coherent. 
(xvi) If T is obtained from T’ by the rule (A): 
then 1sz* ={t-(X, a), z;(X, a) E IAa.Al and t-o, z E ?r’[X/a]*. Here we use the substi- 
tution of the new constant X for a. 
The compatibility of distinct sequences u= (X, a), z and u = ( Y, b), t is shown as 
follows: take 2 together with f~ COH(X, Z), g E COH( Y, 2); then, consider a’ = 
A[ f/a](a) and b’ = A[g/ a]( b). Then, the general properties of the interpretation, 
as studied in [S], show that +a’, z and t-b’, t both belong to ?r[Z/a!]*, hence, are 
coherent. Moreover, they are still distinct by the general properties of a trace. If z 
is coherent with t, then u is coherent with u; otherwise, a’“b’ mod A[Z/tx] and 
then, (X, a)-( Y, 6) [mod Aa.A] from which we conclude again. 
(xvii) If T is obtained from 7~’ by the rule (V): 
t-+wv4, c 
t-VarmA, C ’ 
then #‘= {t-(X, a), z;(X, a) E IVa.AJ and 3j~ COH(X, B): +A[f/a](a), z E m’*}. 
Assume that (X, a), z (= u) and ( Y, b), t (= u) are two distinct elements of W* with 
witnesses f; g in COH(X, B) and COH( Y, B). If a’ = A[f/iJ(a), if b’ = A[f/a!]( b), 
then a’, zcb’, t mod A[B/ar], C, and these two sequences are distinct. Then, either 
2-t [mod C] or a lnb’ mod A[B/ar], in which case (X, a)^( Y, b) [mod VacA]; in 
both cases, u is coherent with u. This rule is the other case (after the cut-rule) of 
an existentiai quantifier. Were too, we have unicity: if the element (X, a), z of n.* 
is witnessed by both j; g E COH(X, A[ B/a]), then, with a’ = A[ f/ar]( a), a” = 
A[g/a](a), we get the coherence of a’, z and a’, z But, looking at the definition 
of Va.A we see that a%a” mod A[ B/a], so a’= a’. Hence, the element a’ ‘above’ 
Q is uniquely determined (unfortunately, f is not uniquely determined because of 
reservation of kernels; however, the range off is uniquely determined). 
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s. (i) The fact that the ut-rule formally behaves like the existential 
rule can be explained as follows: efine a formula CUT as Vcy.ar@cu’-; then, 
semantically speaking, CUT cola&s of a trivial unit coherent space with only one 
point, namely ( , (1,l)) (= a,). Now it is easy to show that the cut-rule can be 
mimicked by the formula CUT: 
0 
. 
(This is not far from some techniques used in [6].) Now, given premises 7r’ and w” 
of a cut-rule, let us compare the semantic interpretation of the proofs m and I_G 
obtained by applying in one case the cut-rule, in the other case the procedure given 
above: pi* = {t-a,, z; z E r*}, which means that there is no significant difference 
between both interpretations, and the unicity features of the cut-rule are therefcre 
explainable from the similar features of the existential rule. 
(ii) Assume, just for a minute, that we try to compute the semtlntics of a proof 
7;, ifi SS * 4-r +n Ann;& .V.) VJb CEJ cu uwvluv, given z E I&41, whether ep nh+ q = m*. In a!! cases but (ii) u. &I”& * L .I 
and (xvii), the problem is immediately reduced to several simpler problems of the 
sdme type, with an effective bound on these problems. But in Definition 3.15(ii) 
and (xvii), the problem is reduced to infinitely many simpler ones, due to the 
presence of an unbounded existential quantifier. But this existential part is unique, 
i.e., in some sense there is a well-defined z’ ‘above’ 5 summarizing the existential 
requirements on z. We can also think of z’ as implicitlgt definsd by Z. In particular, 
cut-elimination looks as the elimination of implicit features, an elimination which 
can be achieved when the formula proved has no existential type. 
This basic remark is the key to a semantic approach to computation, which will 
be undertaken somewhere lse. Also observe that we are tempted to remove not 
only cuts, but also (V)-rules ! 
The just given semantics of sequential proofs induces a semantics of the corre- 
sponding proof-nets: one simply has to make the boring verification that, whenever 
7r- = p-, we have ‘OT* =p*. Now, one could dream to work with proof-nets directly, 
without sequentializing. We shall illustrate this by a semantic interpretation of PNO, 
directly defined on the proof-nets. PNO has been chosen because of its syntactic 
simplicity, and because in PNO all the difficulties of the task are concentrated; from 
the sketch given here, there is no problem to move to PN2. 
(experiments). Let p be a proof-net in NO. For each terminal 
formula A of p, we select an element Q from the web of (the interpretation of) r4. 
ing upwards, we construct, for each formula of the net, say & an 
I. For the symmetry of the argument, it is convenient o consider ?he 
terminal symbol CUT as interpreted as a unit coherent space {kp& 
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(i) Assume that we have a binary @- or V-link v; we have already chosen 
CE ICI; now, ICI = IAi@lBI, i.e., c= (a, 6); then we choose a in IAI, b in I 
(ii) Assume that we have a cut-link w; in ICUTI, a0 has been chosen by 
convention. We select an arbitrary element a E !A( (if IAl # 0) and we put this element 
a both in IAl and IA-‘-I; in case IAl = $3, the process fails. 
By moving upwards, we eventually obtain (provided we never fail) an assignment 
of points for each formula of the net and this assignment is called an experiment. 
In the experiment, some choices have been made which were not mechanical. Now, 
for each axiom link A A*, we have selected points U’E IA;, a’% 1 AI. The experiment 
succeeds when, for any such link, the two choices are the same, i.e., Q’ = Q”. 
A sequence of points in the interpretations of the conclusion of fi belongs to p* 
exactly when there is a successful experiment starting with those points. 
. Compatibility Tlwnaem. Assume that we have made two experiments in/3 (corre- 
sponding to two terminal sequences a’, a”) and that these experiments succeed; then 
a’ and Q” are coherent (in the sense of the par of the conclusions). 
Pro0 f. Immediate conseqtence of the following lemma. 
patibility Lemma. Assume that b’ and b’ are two experiments in p, and 
that, for any conclusion A of /3, the corresponding points. a’, a” are incoherent: 
aka ” [mod A]; then the two experiments coincide. (In particular, there is exactly one 
successful experiment corresponding to a given sequence of p*.) 
roof. For each formula A of B, we shall write A : C (respectively, -) x, -, =, t’) 
to indicate the corresponding relation between the two inhabitants of A that have 
been chosen in both experiments. Now, the proof proceeds as follows. 
(i) In the case of a O-link w, we shall distinguish between two cases: 
Case 1: A@B:C or A:-; 
Case 2: A@B:c or B:‘? 
Clearly, one of these cases holds. 
(ii) In the case of a %link w, we shall distinguish between two cases: 
Case 1: APB:= orA:#; 
Case2: AT?B:= or B:#. 
ere too, one of these cases holds. 
We shall now prove the impossibility of being always in Case 1, except if 
ln fact, if n is the number of multiplicative switches, thc:~e are 2” simultaneous 
cases that may occur, and, by symmetry, the argumeam; HZ&~ in this particular 
is Lemma 3.18 ‘, wiiU f;&w. 
a given terminal F~;~oY.:~L A, . The hypothesis 
t the end of the trip, we want to arrive with the Cf~~&.Gcri A, : 2. We 
shall visit all formulas twice: upwards, we shall conclude _:. : X; downwards, we 
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shall conclude A : C. ence, a formula visited twice is such that A : =, and we 
shall be done. When we start, the switches are not yet set; this will be done as follows: 
(1) Assume that we arrive for the first time in a link w, and that we arrive 
through the conclusion A@ B; so we are upwards, i.e., A@ B: X. Since we are in 
Case I, A: X, so set the switch on “R” to go to A”. 
(2) Assume that we arrive for the jirst time in a link s$, and that we arrive 
through the premise A; so we are downwards, i.e., A : C. Since we are in Case 1, 
A@B:C, so set the switch on “L” to move to A@ B, . 
(3) As in (2), but arriving through B: switch on “R”. 
(4) Assume that we arrive for the jrst time in a link $& and that we arrive 
through the conclusion A ‘18 B; so we are upwards, i.e., A 38 B : X. But then, observe 
that B:,‘, so set the switch on ‘3” to move to B”. 
(5) Assume that we arrive for the first time in a link $T&, and that we arrive 
through the premise A; so we are downwards, i.e., A : C. Since we are in Case I, 
AV B:C, so set the switch on ‘I” to move to A T? B,. 
(6) As in (5), but arriving through B: we are downwards, i.e., B: S; we have 
two subcases: 
(6)(a): if B:=, then switch on “L” to go to B^; 
(6)(b): if B: #, then A T!? B: “; hence, A T B: S; switch on “R” to go to 
ATB,. 
(7) Assume that we arrive for the second time in a link w and t 
passage was as in (1); then we come tack through A,, i.e., A: C. Since we are in 
Case 1, A@B:C and since we had A@B:X, we get A@:=. 
and the next step to BA will be sound. 
(8) Assume that we arrive for the second time in a link $&, and that the first 
time was as in (2) or (3); now, the order of passage is such that we arrive through 
A@ BA, i.e., A@B:X; but we already had A@ B : C, so A@ B : = and SO, A : x, 
B :X and the next step to AA or BA will be sound. 
(9) Assume that we arrive for the second time in a link && and that the first 
time was as in (4); so we arrive through A,, i.e., A: S; but we had 
which A:=, so A: =, but we are in Case 1, hence, A 18 B : =. The 
trip to AA is clearly sound since A: C. 
(10) Assume that we arrive for the second time in a link w, and that t 
passage was as in (5) or (6); we have two subcases: 
(IO)(a): first passage as in (6)(a): we arrive through 
had B:=, hence, A 38 B:C and the next step to A 
(HO)(b): first passage as in (5) 
had already passed through A 27 
/lA or BA will be sound, since 
f, B I) ~Rs:~oB~~ that we arrive for the third time in a multiplicative lin 
have already seen in cases (7), ($), (9) and (10)(b) that c: =. In ease (lC)(@ for 
the second passage, we are in A ‘18 BA after being in A 79 B,, so here too, C : =; but 
then, in every case, A : =, B : =, and the next step is sound. 
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(12) Assume that we arrive in a conclusion Ai, i.e., A’ : C; then we can move to 
A3 because of the hypothesis Ai : X. 
(13) Assume that we arrive on one side of a cut-rule w, say through A,; 
then, A: C from which it is immediate that A*: X (the points are the same) and 
so the move to Al” is logically sound. 
(14) Assume that we arrive on one side of an axiom A A*, ~,ay through AA; 
then, A:X from which it is immediate that A I: S (the points are the same) and 
the move to At is logically sound. 
(v) Summing up now, we have obtained A: = for any formula A. 0 
3.1 emark. The same argument works for PN2, with a heavier apparatus. In 
experiments, we have to choose existential witnesses, but the same unicity can be 
*obtained; i.e., there is only one successful experiment. (In a rule 
AWI al 
Va.A 
observe that Va.A: V implies A[ B/a]: X, and that A[ B/a] : S implies Va.A: C.) 
. Normalization in PN2 
Fe shall define a normalizing algorithm for proof-nets. The algorithm is a rewriting 
procedure (contraction) whose properties are as follows: 
(i) If p cntr B’, then p and p’ have the same terminal formulas (conclusions). 
(ii) If J3 cntr p’, then p’* = /3* (semantic soundness). 
(iii) There is a /3’ such that p cntr 6’ iff p contains CUT-links; a proof-net /3 with 
no CUT-link is scrid to be normal. 
eduction is defined as the transitive closure of cntr, and is denoted B =/ p’. It 
is sometimes useful to speak of a reduction sequence from p to /3’, i.e., 
e can also u3e the notation p =/, p’ to indicate the existence of a reduction 
sequence of length n + 1 from p to p’. The main property of reduction is the 
foilswing: 
(iv) Strong normalization: A proof-net p is said to be SN when there is no infi 
reduction sequence starting from p; in this case we define the integer N(P) as 
greatest n such that p =/” p’ for some p’. (By Kiinig’s Lemma, using the fact that, 
tely many /3’ such that p =/p’, N(P) is definable.) 
/3) in general by 
at /3 is SN exactly when N(P) < W. The Strong Normalization Theorem, which 
ain result of this section, says that all proof-nets of PN2 are SN. One of 
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the main problems with our procedure is that it is not Church-Rosser, i.e., p may 
reduce to normaI forms /3’ and p” which are distinct. &Never, p’* = p”* so that 
they do not differ too much. In particular we shall see i. A Section V how to represent 
booleans, integers, etc. in PN2. 
A given integer (say 10) has several representations in PN2, all very close one to 
another. What we want is that if one reduction sequence yields the result 10, another 
does not yield the result 28; semantically speaking however, any representation of 
10 in PN2 is interpreted in the same way as some set lo*, similarly for 28 and, 
clearly, 10” # 28”; hence there is no ambiguity. 
One of the most interesting features of strong normalization is the possibility to 
ignore certain normalization rules. If we decide to use all contractions except, say 
(R), we eventually reach a normal form relative to (R), i.e., a proof-net where the 
only contractions that can be performed are instances of (R). In some cases, this 
is enough to ensure that we reach a normal form without using (R). 
Let us give an example demonstrating this possibility: Imagine that we ignore 
the commutation rule for &. If we start with a proof-net not involving & or V in 
its conclusions, and take a relative normal form p for it, then assume p is not 
normal. We start with a CUT w, where Cl is the auxiliary door of a &-box. 
So let us go to the front-door C’ of this box: the downmost formula below C’, say 
D, bears one of the symbols & or V, so it cannot be a conclusion., and is therefore 
the premise of a CUT-rule. The other premise D’ is again the auxiliary door of a 
&-box. Iterating the process we eventually find a cycle since there are finitely many 
cuts in p from which a shorttrip is easily made. Thus, we have contradicted the 
assumption that p was not cut-free. 
By the way, observe that it was also possible in that case to forbid contractions 
inside &-boxes and still arrive at a normal form: strong normalization justifies lazy 
strategies for computation. 
We shall now describe the normalization procedure by giving the contraction 
rules. They are divided into three groups, axiom contraction (Section 
ccntractions (Section 4.2), and commutative contractions (Section 4.3). For each of 
these groups we establish, with the definition, the semantic soundness of the 
contraction rule. In order to save space, it is very convenient o corrsi 
as symmetric, i.e., w and w are exactly the same lin 
our graphical representations, it wil ossible to put what is most convenient on 
the left, in order to av CaSeS ! 
xiom con traction 
A Al i by: ; 
t 
CUT 5’ 
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two occurrences of A and removing A’- and the CUT- and 
already seen that the two occurrences of A are necessarily 
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i.e., by identifying the 
axiom-links. We have 
distinct. 
We show the semantic soundness of (AC): assume that p c p’ by (AC), then 
p* - p’* is shown by induction on the number n of boxes containing the CUT we 
contract. 
Basis step: If n = 0, then consider an experiment in p’ corresponding to a certain 
choice of values z for the conclusions. If the experiment succeeds, let x be the point 
chosen in the formula A. Now, we can form an experiment in p corresponding to 
the same initial choice z: for the cut-rule, choose X, both in A and A-‘-, and report 
the values from the given experiment everywhere lse. This new experiment succeeds, 
so p’* c /3*. Conversely, from a successful experiment in p, it is not difficult to 
deduce a successful experiment in p’: at the level of the cut-rule, we have to guess 
a value y E IAl = IA,j, but, in order for the experiment o succeed, this value has to 
be the same as the value x already chosen in the ‘left’ ~4, and so it is perfectly 
harmless to identify the two A’s: @*c p’*. 
Induction step: If n # 0, then the contraction takes place within a box B, replaced 
by IB’. Now, boxes are built in such a way that (using the induction hypothesis) 
IEB” = lB’*. Then the semantics of p and b’ will coincide since they are built in the 
same way from these boxes. (In later contractions, as this argument is perfectly 
general, we shall always assume that the contraction is not done within a box.) 
4.2. Symmetric contractions 
This concerns all CUT-links where one side comes by a rule, whereas the other 
side comes by the dual rule. 
.1. efinition ( T-contraction). Since there is no rule for 0, this case never occurs! 
ition (addition contraction: (&/ IO-SC)). A configuration as in Fig. 18(a) 
is replaced by the one in Fig. 18(b). 
-C-A&B- - _ 
t CUT t 
CUT 
Fig. 18. (k/l O-SC). 
he semantic soundness is shown as follows: e moment, we have 
ve to guess an eleme Inside the box; 
l or c, b in according to the case. owever, due to 
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the (l@)-rule, the choice of (1, b) would be a failure, SO the only successU choice 
is (0, a), in which case we proceed above AL by choosing a. Now, in p’, we have 
to choose some a in IAI, and then go up in p1 and in A’. This establishes clearly 
that /3* = /3’*. 
(additive contraction: (k/2@-SC)). This case is perfectly symmetric 
to (&/lO-SC). 
.4. Definition, ( rz4 ~CLC contraction : ( /l-SC)). A configuration as in Fig. 19(a) is 
replaced by the one in Fig. 19(b). 





1 R ’ 1 ’ 
\ I 




The semantic soundness is immediate: In /3, we have to guess an element of 111, 
and there is only one choice: 1. This value is reported in the box, but not used. 
What matters is the choice of values c E C, just as in p’, so /3* = p’*. 
4.5. Definition (multiplicative contraction: (@/V-SC)). A configuration as in Fig. 
20(a) is replaced by the one in Fig. 20(b). 
CUT CUT CUT 
(a) 
Fig. 20. (@/la-SC). 
(W 
The semantic soundness is proved as follows: In p we have to guess a pair (x, y), 
then report it in the two premises, and then dispatch the components, x in A and 
Al, y in B and B1. But this amounts exactly to guessing (in p’) x in IAl and y in 
1 Bl, etc. 
(exponential contraction ( !/ W?- SC)). A configuration as in Fig. 2 1 (a) 
is replaced by the one in Fig. 21(b), where several we 
is a typical example where Church-Rosser is violate 
put several weakenings in the same box (w 
doj, the probiem wouid at ieast disappear from this case. 





21. (!/ W?-SC). 
The semantic soundness is proved as follows: In /3, we are given sequences c (in 
). We have to guess an element a of I!AI. Now, the element has 
to be transferred into the right box, and the general definition says that a = $3. Also, 
if a = 0, the general definition for the left box imposes the requirement hat all 
elements of the sequence c are void, nothing else. Hence, in p, we only require 
c = 0 and then transfer d to &, which is exactly what we do in p’. 
.7. nition (exponential contraction ( !/ D?-SC)). A configuration as in Fig. 22(a) 
is replaced by the one in Fig. 22(b). 
c- 
I ’ R1’: 
r-l 
t 
‘?C- A’ L 
c- 
t ’ (1 - 
\ / 1 
F 
-I -!A ?A r-l 1 =/A A 
CUT $- CUT 
(a) (W 
- I !A- . ?( l!J +I ?C- !A ?A- 
4 
L-B 
I CUT CUT CUT 
(a) 7 
(W 
Fig. 22. ( !/D?-SC). 
The semantic soundness is established as follows: In p, given the sequence c in 
?C, we have to guess a point a E 1 !AJ. Now, the dereliction rule imposes that a is 
a singleton {z}, and we proceed with z in A’-. But, if we enter the box with c and 
{z}, this means that c, z are reported inside, as can be seen from the ‘unicity remark’ 
rt_~ Definition 3.lS(xv). This means that, in fact, we guess a point z in JAI, and 
~~~~~ed as in p ‘. 
(exponential contraction ( !/ C?-SC)). A configuration as in Fig. 23(a) 
is replaced by the one in Fig. 23(b). In this contraction, there is a duplication of a 
Fig. 23. (t/C?-SC). 
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box, and several rules (C?) are used; this rule is responsible for the loss of control 
over the normalization time. 
The semantic soundness of the rule is established as follows: In p, we start with 
c in ? and we guess some a in !!A!. For the rule (C?), we have to guess again a 
decomposition a = a’u a”. We enter the box with c, a. In p’, we have to guess 
elements a’ (left) and a’ (right) of 1 AI. But we also have to guess a decomposition 
of c as c’u c”. Then we have two boxes to enter: one with c’, a’ and one with c’, a’. 
Now, the box IEB, which is used in p and recopied twice in /3’, is such that if 
c’, a’/c”, a” belong to B*, so do c’u c” and a’ u a”. Conversely, if c, a’u a’ E IEB*, 
then c can be uniquely decomposed as c’ u c” so that c’, a’/c’, a” E El*. This means 
that the successful experiments in both proof-nets are in l-l correspondence and 
we are done. 
4.9. Definition (quantijkation contraction (A/ V-SC)). Replace a configuration as 
in Fig. 24(a) by the one in Fig. 24(b). 
1 
[B/a] AI 
v 1 a.A 
CUT f CUT 
Fig. 24. (A/V-SC). 
The semantic soundness is checked as follows: We start with c in C and we have 
to guess an element (X, z) in Il\a.Al. Above the rule (V), we have to guess an 
element f~ COH(X, B) in order to get z’ =A[f/a]+(z), a point in IA[B/a]I. We 
also have to check that c and (X, z) are in B*, where lE3 is the left box. Now, the 
general functoriality properties (see [S]) make it the same as to verify that c, z’ is 
in P1[B/a]*. From this, the soundness of this case follows. 
4.3. Commutative contractions 
nition. In order to state the commutative contractions, we need the concept 
of a ghost box. The ghost boxes can be formed for CUT- or @-links (this is just a 
geometrical feature), and we discuss them for a CUT-link only. So, if we have such 
a link w, we can consider the empire eB of B. In eB, there is a frontier, made 
of B, of the conclusions of /3 belonging to eB (in this description, we assume that 
the CUT is not in a box, just to simplify everything), and of premises of (79)- and 
(C?)-links such that the other premise is not in the box. Let us list the frontier of 
B; we can form a box (the ghost box) 
of the box will be , B. If we replace e 
a a teridiza tion. 
inside, and the doors 
ox, we are executi 
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marks. (i) In terms of computation, materialization is a very feasib 
nce it slices to start a trip with BA and to set the switches arbitrarily. 
in the case we enter a rclle (79) or (C?) for the first time and from above, the switch 
is set such that we move backwards: when we eventually arrive in B,, we have 
passed exactly through eB, so there is no problem to describe eB very quickly. 
(ii) When, in turn, our CUT is in a box, then the box is made out of one of 
several proof-nets arranged together, and the CUT occurs in one of these nets; in 
this net, the concept of a ghost box makes sense, and it is in this way that we define 
the ghost box of a nested cut. 
(iii) The main point is to prove that materialization produces a sound proof-net; 
in fact, we shall establish more, namely that we can simultaneously materialize eB 
and eBL as is stated in the following theorem. 
eoremc The proof-structure obtained by n. zterializing eB and eBL is sound. 
We argue by induction on the number of links outside eB u eB’. In the case 
of PNQ all the dilEculties are concentrated, hence, we restrict ourselves to this case. 
(i) If the only link outside eB u eB-” is the CUT-link, then the proof splits and 
the materialization looks as shown in Fig. 25, which is a proof-net. 
CUT 
Fig. 25. 
(ii) If there is a terminal %:ink outside eB u eB*, then remove it in order to get 
/3’. Now, the materialization of /3 is the materialization of p’ to which we have 
added the terminal V-link. 
(iii) Otherwise, observe that there is a terminal @ or CUT-link with premises E 
and F such that eE u eF is maximal and eB u eB’- c eE (or eF). The reason for 
this is that, when we have a terminal @- or CUT-link such that the empires eC and 
eD above are not such that eC u eD is maximal, then we can conclude the existence 
of a conflicting %link, as in the Splitting Theorem; now, what is below this conflict 
is in neither empires; hence, if all terminal ?&links are in eC u eD, it follows that 
there is a terminal @- or CUT-link below the conflict. We can conclude as in the 
Splitting Theorem that eC u eD c eE (or eF). Now, there is a splitting of p as 
shown in Fig. 26 (case of a tensor-link, eC u eD c eE). From the materialization 
in PI, it is easy to obtain the materialization in p. 0 
EIBF 
Fig. 26. 
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It remains to examine the CUT-links which are not covered by the two cases 
already considered in the proof of Theorem 4.12. The only possibility is that at least 
one premise is the auxiliary door of a box. 
efinitio 
replaced by &he 
(zero com?Wation (T-CC)). The configuration in Fig. 27(a) is 
one in Fig. 27(b). To do this, we have proceeded as follows: In a 
(a) -(b) -- 
Fig. 27. (T-CC). 
first time, we have a materialization of the ghost box eA*, in a second time, we 
have the replacement of the configuration involving both boxes by another one. 
The semantic soundness is vacuously satisfied since, due to the presence of T 
with its void web, in both cases we never have anything to verify at this stage. 
4.14. Definition (additive commutation (&-CC)), The configuration in Fig. 28(a) is 
replaced by the one in Fig. 28(b). 
'I - A & B-C-D- -D- 
t Y CUT 
(a) 
d I e I 
c-a - - - 
f -N I 
/ \ ; 
/ 
‘I i--- -f 
4 
d : / I eD 1 I 
\ 
% ; ;” 
d 
’ I R2 ), 





4 T i 
W 
Fig. 28. (&-CC). 
oundness is established as follows: are given c, e in 
1, say (0, ii). In /3 we have to g [u"I; fiGigi ihiS 'bt'tt pSXXt?d 
by putting (0, a), c, d in the left box and after a, c, d in PI, we also put d, e in the 
ghost box. In p’, we proceed in a different order, namely that (0, a), c, e is transferred 
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to the left box and then looks as Q, c, e, inside the box. Then we have to guess d E IDI 
and then dispatch a, c, d in & , 4 e in eDA. 
Remark: Of course, the ghost box is used only temporarily: after writing the 
contracturn, one erases it; the fact that the erasing of a ghost box causes no problem 
is practically immediate. 
nition (unit commutation (I-CC)). The configuration in Fig. 29(a) is 






Fig. 29. (L-CC). 
The semantic soundness of this contraction is established as follows: In p, we 
start lvith 1 E ll.1, a in and c E I Cl= We then have to guess some 6 E IBI. Once 6 
has been chosen, these elements are dispatched between the two boxes: 6, c in the 
ghost box, 1, a, 6 in the left box, i.e., a, 6 in p,. What happens in p is almost the 
same: 1, u, 6 is transferred LO the box so that it becomes a, C; then we guess 4 and 
u, 6 go to & while 6, c go to eB. 
(exponential commutation ( W?-CC)). This case is exactly the same 
as the one in Definition 4.15 except hat the formula I is replaced by a formula ?D. 
7. ition (quantijicative commutation (/\-CC)). The configuration in Fig. 
3G(aj is replaced by the one in Fig. 30(b). 
oved as follows: In p, we sta h (X, z) E IAa.Al, 
ICI. From this, we dispatch to eC’- and (X, z) 
6: is transferred to P,[X/a]. In p’, starting with the same 
the interior of the box and they be 
a]. Then we guess CE ICI, and z, 
to eCL. 
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4 t CUT t 
(4 
L A CUT a.A -B - D 
t t i 
(W 
Fig. 30. (A-CC). 
efinition (exponential commutation ( !-CC)). The last case is that of a !-box. 
Here, the ghost boxes would be of no use, so there is no general pattern of 
commutation. However, we must be able to do something in all possible CUT- 
situations. Let us look, however, at the other premise of the CUT: it is of the form 
!C. Now, if we cannot do something on that side, this means that !C is neither the 
conclusion of an axiom-link nor the auxiliary door of a box; the only possibility is 
that !C is the main door of a !-box: the configuration in Fig. 3 1 (a) is replaced by 








?B- !C I - 
e - 
f . 
'?Cl 3D ,A' 
?C I:, Ifi . 0.. - 
t CUT t t 
(4 
(’ y; py- 
'?B _ C' - 
1 :I 
R2J 
?B !C ?C -.?D- A - 
CUT - 
I ?B !A- 
-i 
Fig. 31. (!-CC). 
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In order to prove the soundness, consider b3 d, a in ? ?I% ?A; we first have to 
guess (in p) an element c E ICI, and then to dispatch it between the two boxes: on 
the left, it becomes b, c on the right c, d, a. Assume that a = {x,, . . . , x,}, c = 
1 219 . . . , z,,,}; within the boxes, we have to guess decompositions b = 
and then consider simultaneously b, , z,/ l l l /bm, z,,,. Further, c = cl 
d,u* l . u d,, and we have to consider simultaneously cl, dl, x,/ l l l 1
consider b’,, l l l , b; defined by bJ = u{b i ; zj E ci}. Then the left part of the experiment 
amounts to the same as verifying that b’,, c,/ l l l lb:, c, belong to the left box. Now, 
if we start with the same i aa data in p’, we are first faced with guessing a 
decomposition b = b’, u l 9 l l u d,, followed by separately study- 
ing bl, d,, x,/ l . l lb,,, d,,, x,,. In , xi, we have to guess some ci in 
ICI and then dispatch between the two sides bi, Ci on the left, ci, di, xi on the right, 
and the problem is therefore strictly equivalent to the problem of p. 
emark. Any binary link with the same geometry as CUT, typically 0, can 
give rise to commutative contractions; in particular, the analogues of Definitions 
4.13-4.18 for @ are easily written. 
Our goal is, as stated, strong normalization. It is however quite interesting to give 
the Small Normalization ‘Ilheorem first, which gives a very quick normalization proof 
for PN2, provided ( !/ C ?-SC) is not used. 
nition. The size s(p) of a proof-net p is defined by induction on p as 
follows: 
(i) If p is built from boxes Ii&, . . . , S, and formulas A,, . . . , Ak by means of 
usual unary or binary links, then s(p) = s(B,) l . . . l s(B,) l 2’ (in other terms, 
formulas are counted to be of size 2). 
(ii) If fl is a box, then the size of p is defined as follows: 
- if p is a T-box, T, C,, . . . , C,, then s(p) =2+ n; 
- if p comes from p’ by the schemes for I, W?, /\ , !, then s(p) = s(p’) + 1; 
- if B comes from p’, p” by the scheme for &, then s(F) = s(p’)+s(p”)+ 1. 
a. In all contraction rules but (!/C?-SC), the size strictly diminishes. 
We have to go through 14 cases. First, observe that s(p) > n if /3 has n 
onclusions. In order to prove the lemma, one can make the simplifying hypothesis 
that the cut contracted is not inside a box. 
- (AC) divides the size by 4; 
- in (&/l@-SC), a size (x+ y+ 1) l 22 is replaced by a size X* z; 
-SC), a size 2 l (x + 1) is replaced by a size x; 
-SC), a size x l Z6 is replaced by a size x 9 24; 
?-SC), a size (x + 1) e (y + E ) l z is replaced by a size (y + n) l z for some 
f-3 s X’ 9 
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I in (!/ D?-SC), a size (x+ 1) l 42 is replaced by a size x l 22; 
W in (A/ V-SC), a size (x + 1) l 42 is replaced by a size x l 22; 
- in (T-CC), a size (3 + n) l x l y is replaced by a size (2+ n + m) l y, with m < x; 
w in (&-CC), a size (x + y + 1) 0 z l t is replaced by a size (xz +yz + 1) l t; 
- in (L-CC), a size (x+ 1) l y l z is replaced by a size (xy+ 1) . z; 
_ in (A-CC), a size (x + 1) l y s z is replaced by a size (xy + 1) l z; 
m in (!-CC), a size (x+1) l (y+l) l z is replaced by a size (x0 (y+l)+l) l z. 
All cases have been treated except trivial variants. Cl 
4.22. Corollary (small Normalization Theorem ). PN2 without ( !/ C ?-Se) s 
strong normalization. 
Proof. Clearly, N(P) s s(p). Cl 
4.23. Remarks. (i) In (!/ C?-SC), a size (x + 1) l 8z becomes (x + l)* 9 42 l 2”, where 
n < x. Suddenly, the size explodes. Is it possible to fix this defect? Obviously not, 
because PN2 has, roughly spoken, the same expressive power as the system F, i.e. 
the normalization theorem for F is not provable in PA,, so it would simply be 
childish to try to improve the Small Normalization Theorem by toying with the 
definition. There is however an open possibility: one can define generalized sizes 
(no longer integers), typically in the case of the !-box, so that we still have a 
phenomenon of decrease; these generalized numbers could be something like 
ordinals, dilators, ptykes. Such an achievement seems highly probable (but difficult); 
it would immediately yield something like an ordinal analysis of PA*. 
(ii) To some extent, the Small Normalization Theorem is more important than 
its more refined and delicate elder brother! This is because normalization is now 
clearly divided into two aspects. 
(1) The quick normalization devices which reduce size: These devices must be 
seen as communication devices and our small theorem says that this part works 
-*onderfully well and quickly in PN2 (for those who may be afraid by the exponen- 
tlals involved in sizes, remember that there is no necessity, no intention to work 
sequentially . . .). In particular, we could have put nonterminating devices inside 
those awful !-boxes; this would not afiect the quality of the parallelism, the programs 
would simply run forever. But the structure Q/A would remain sound. 
(2) The device (!/?C-SC), which can be seen as the execution device of the system: 
The Strong Normalization Theorem will prove that this device, together with the 
others, leads to terminating algorithms, and, this is essential for the expressive power 
of PN2 which should be essentially the same as that of F. General parallel systems, 
for instance those that run forever, could be obtained by ta ing different execution 
devices, to be put in carefully sealed boxes! 
In spite of the defect w.r.t. the Church- 
w.r.t. the communication devices could be see 
equivalence of programs. 
rty, the interconvertibility 
s candidate for ex 
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We now turn our attention towards the general case; fo< this we need to establish 
some facts about strong normalization relating it to simple normalization. 
A contraction is standard when it does not erase any symbol CUT 
besides the one explicitly considered. Concretely, this means that some parts of the 
configuration we replace have to be cut-free, namely: 
- in (&/l@-SC), & must be cat-free, 
- in (&/2@-SC), p, must be cut-free, 
- in (!/ W?-SC), p, must be cut-free, 
- in (T-CC), eAl must be cut-free. 
A reduction sequence is standard when made of standard contractions. 
.25. (Standardization Lemma).’ Let /3 be a proof-net and assunv that there 
is a standard reduction from p to a cut-free 0’. ?hen p is SA? 
The delicate but boring proof is postpone 
of the Strong Normalization Theorem. 
e immediately jump to the proof 
ormalization Theorem). In N2 all proofinets are strongly 
e idea is to adapt the techni ue of ‘candidats de riductibilite’ of [I] to 
the case of PN2; in fact, the symmetry of linear negation makes it easier to some 
exte uring the proof, i .25) is constantly 
used. 
roof-net /3 together with a 
ations, we shall alw 
at consists in consideri istinguished conclusion to be 
CUT 
’ The proof will be sketched in Section 6. 
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(ii: If CUT(t, u) is SN, then u is SN. 
: This proof already uses the Standardization Lemma: CUT& u) co t by a 
standard contraction when u is the axiom link. ence, if u is SN, there is a standard 
reduction from u to a normal form, and therefore, from t: but then t is SN, too. 0 
A CR (candidat de rtfductibilite’) of type A is a set X of terms of 
type A such that 
0 i 
( ) ii . . . 
( ) 111 
x+0; 
all terms of X are SN; 
x = xl*. 
Examples. A typical way to generate a CR of type A is to take the orthogonal 
Y’- of any nonvoid set Y of SN-terms of type A'-. In particular, taking Y to consist 
of an axiom. link, we obtain the CR SN(A) formed of all SN terms of type A. 
4.26.6. Definition. Assume that A [a] (where a = a,, . . . , a, is a sequence of proposi- 
tional variables) is a proposition, and let (=B1,...,B,,) be a sequence of 
propositions; let X (= X1, . . . , Xn) be a sequence of CR’s of respective types 
Then we define a CR RED(A[X/a]) of type A[ /a], as follows: 
(i) RED(l[X/a]) ={l}‘; (T[X/al) = SN(Tk 
(ii) if A is Ui, then RED( a]) is Xi; 
(iii) if A is A' 79 A", then RED(A[X/a]) is defined as the orthogonal of the set 
RED(A’[X/a])‘.RED(A”[ rmed of all proof-nets as shown in Fig. 33 with 
t E RED(A’[X/a])‘, u E R 
/- 
r’ t ) 
PC \ 
(‘u 1 




(iv) If S is A' & A", then RED(A[ /a]) is defined as the orthogonal of the union 
of the two sets: 
V’(RED(A’[ I’)) and l*(RE 
formed of all proof-nets obtained from a term t of A’[ 
by applying (10) (respectively (20)) (see Fig. 34). 
]I (respectively 
Fig. 34. 
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?A’, then RED(A[ the orthogonal of the set 
1’) formed of all terms of type !A’[ 1’ of the form s 
- ?C ! (A'B/a c 1 1 - -- 
Fig. 35. 
f A is l\b.A’, then RED( A[ al) is defined as the orthogonal of the set z 
formed of all terms of type A 6.A’ al of the form shown in Fig. 36 such that, 
for some CR Y of type C, t E RE 
Fig. 36. 
(vii) All other cases are treated by orthogonality, e.g., RED( !A[X/ a]) = 
(Substitution Lemma) 
RED( C[X/a])/a, 61). 
This lemma shply states that the definition of reducibility is compatible 
with substitution. This is established without difficulty once the formalism has been 
understood. Remark that there is here a hidden use of second-order comprehension 
(to define a set by /a]). The proof of the Strong Normalization Theorem 
is not formalizable ecause of the use of the Substitution Lemma with 
unbounded C’s. This must be familiar to people who know the original proof for 
F. cl 
. A proof-net /3 with conclusions C is said to be reducible when 
the following holds: Let be the list of all free variables of and let us choose a 
sequence of formulas f CR of types 
everal cuts with all formulas of 
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We argue by induction on a proof-net /3. Since the substitutions and 
lay no active role but make everything ha read (and to write!), we shall 
not indicate them, working therefore with RE , etc. The reader will be able 
to make the straightforward reconstruction himself. 
Casel: pisA Al; we have to show that, for any t, u in RED(A)‘-, 
CUT@; t, u) is SN. But there is a standa reduction from CUT@; t, u) to CUT( t, u) 
which is SN by the definition of ortho ahty; by standardization, CUT@; t, 00 is 
SN. 
Case 2: p is 1; we have to show that CUT@; t) E SN for all t E RED(I). However 
RED( 1) = { l}*l; hence, CUT(P; t) = CUT(& t) is SN. 
Case 3: p is m; choose t E RED(O), E RED( C’); here a general remark 
must be made: Since RED( = ZL, where 2 consists of the axiom-link 
it is possible to replace RED(O) by Z! Hence, t is he axiom-link. NOW i 
easy, using the fact that u are SN, to produce a standard normalization for 
CUT@; t, u). 
Case 4: p comes from /3’ by the l-box in Fig. 38. Choose t E RED( 
u E RED(A’-) and consider CUT(P; t, u). As we did in Case 3, one can restrict to 
t = 1, and there is a standard reduction from CUT@; t, u) to CUT(P’; 
SN by hypothesis. 
Case 5: p comes from /?’ by (V) (see Fig. 39). After simplification (this refers 
to the remark made in Case 3), we are led to kmn CUT@; t @ 
u E RED( B’), @ E RED( ‘). t 0 u indicatk:,s the term obtain 
A9 B 
Fig. ?9. 
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Now observe that there is a standard reduction sequence from CU (P; t@u, u) to 
CUT@‘; t, u, u), which is SN by the induction hypothesis. 
Case 6: /3 is obtained from 18’ and p“ by (0) (see Fig. 40). The induction 
hypothesis yields that CUT( p’; t’, a’) is SN for all t’ E RE ‘)I and 
I 1 
J 9 
which means that CUT(P’; u’) E RED(A’). For symmetric reasons, 
-- 
A’ e A” 
Fig. 40. 
RED( A”). By tensori73tion, 
CUT@; ‘, u”) E RED(A’).RED(A”) c RED(A’@ A”) 
by biorthogonality. But then CUT@; u’, u”, V) is SN for any 
Cuse 7: /3 is obtained from p’ by (10) (see Fig. 41). The 
yields CUT(P’; c) E RED(A j for any c E RED(C’j’; 
1’ RED(A) c RED(A@ B) and we are done. 
v ‘Z RED(A’@A”)I. 
induction hypothesis 
then CUT@‘; c) E 
Fig. 41. 
Case 8: p is obtained from j3’ by (20): As Case 7. 
Case 9: j3 is obtained from p’ and p” by the &-box in Fig. 42. After simplification, 
we see that we have to check if CUT@; c, h) and CUT@; c, JL*u) is SN for any 
c E RED( C)‘, t E RED( A)l, and u E RED(B)‘. Now, the induction hypothesis yields 
that fl” is SN, and it is therefore possible to write a standard normalization from 
CUT( /3; c, 1’ t) to CUT( /3’; c, t), which is SN by induction hypothesis. For symmetric 
reasons, CUT@‘; c, l’t) is Sk. 
A&B- 
Fig. 42. 
Case 10: /3 is obtained from p’ by the !-box in Fig. 43. The induction hypothesis 




/ I3’ ‘, 
i / 
?C AN - 
"C-!A- - 
Fig. 43. 
form !d, for de RED( )l. But there is a standard reduction from CUT@; 
CUT( !CUT@‘; c); u) (several (!-CC)). Now, the induction hypothesis says that 
CUT@‘; c) t: RED(A); hence, !CUT(P’; c) E !RED(A) c RED( !A). 
case Ii: ~3 is obtained from p’ by the weakening box in Fig. 44. We must show 
that CUT@; c, !t) is SN for all CE RED(C)* and t E RED(A Now t is SN, and 
there is a standard reduction from CUT@; c, !t) to CUT@‘; c) plus weakenings, 
which is SN by induction hypothesis. 
Fig. 44. 
Case 12: /3 is obtained from p’ by the dereliction rule shown in Fig. 45. We must 
show that CUT(P; c, !t) is SN; but it reduces in a standard way to CUT@‘; c, t), 
which is SN by induction hypothesis. 
?A 
Fig. 45. 
Case 13: ,8 is obtained from /Y by the contraction rule in Fig. 46. We must show 
that CUT@; c, ;cI .., L I+\ ;c CN; but it reduces in a standard way to CUT@; C, !t, !t) plus 
contractions, which is SN by induction hypothesis. 
1 / C-?A-?A 
?A 
Fig. 46. 
&se 14: p is obtained from /3’ by t e /\-rule shown in 
we actually use the substitutions: we have to s 
78 .I. Y. Girard 
Fig. 47. 
u E RED(A[X/u])‘- for some CR X of type B. Now the induction hypothesis yields 
that CUT@‘[ B/a]; c, u) is SN, and observe the existence of a standard reduction 
from CUT@; c, t) to this proof-net. 
Case 15: j3 is obtained from /3’ by the V-rule in Fig. 48. The induction hypothesis 
says that CUT@‘; c) E REr)(A[ B/a]) for any c in RED(C)‘. Now, the Substitution 
Lemma says that RED( A[ B/ a]) = RED( A[ RED( B)/ a]); this shows that 
CUT@‘; c) E 2 where 2 is the set of existential terms such that RED(Vu.A) = Z”-; 
from Zc P-l, we conclude. Cl 
V a.A 
Fig. 48. 
roof of Ttworem 4.26 (conclusion). Apply Theorem 4.26.9 to B = X and t = axiom 
links. q 
. Some useful translations 
5.1. The trunshtion of intuitionistic logic 
The intuitionistic symbols A, V, 3, -I, V, 3 can be considered as defined in linear 
logic. The definitions are as follows: 
AAB=A&B, Av B=(!A)@(!B), 
A=aB=(!A+ B 9 
= l\x.A, 3.x4 - vx. !A. 
In particular, we see that we coul+ hue kbnt the symbols A and V in linear logic, 
provided we have in mind intuitionii,tic onjunction and ‘for all’. The translation(.)” 
from intuitionistic logic to linear logic is defined by means of the above dictionary, 
neity of intuitionistic 
connectives (in s contrast with the t I logic which is very 
regular, if nonconstructive). he most shocking point is the translation of negation: 
Linear logic 
one would have preferred I instead of owever, intuitionistic 
negation has always been widely criticized. On the other hand Andrej kedrov 
pointed out to me the formal analogy between these translations and Kleene’s ‘slash’, 
in particular where the places are determined where a “!” is needed. Even with this 
analogy in mind, it is hard to find a leading principle in this translation; for instance, 
the translation does not follow the principle of restricting to open facts, as a coarse 
analogy with the modal transkion would suggest. 
The translation (.)’ is extended to a translation of proofs. The most efficient one 
is a translation of intuitionistic natural deduction (with 1A defined as 
linear sequent calculus. Here we e a version of 1’ equent calculus wit 
formulas on both sides of “t-“: A I- e ,ranslation is define 
by induction on the length of a deduct .e., of B under the hypotheses 
(A): to such a (d) we associate (d)‘, a linear proof of ! 
(i) (d) is the deduction of (B)B consisting of a hypothesis B; then (d)’ is 
Bat- B” &y. 
!B’I- B” 
(ii) (d) is a deduction of (A’, A”) B’ /\ B” obtained from a deduction (d’) of ( 




(iii) (d) is a deduction of ( ) B’ obtained from a deduction (d’) of ( 
by the first A-elim; then (d)’ is 
B” I- B” 
B” & B’@ I- B” 
O& 
CUT. 
(iv) (d) ends with the second A-elim: symmetric to (iii). 
(v) (d) is a deduction of ( )B’ v B’, obtained from (d’) of ( )B’ by the first 
A-introd; then (d)’ is 
6 The rules are now written as left and right rules; e.g., the rule (8~) now becomes ($8~) (on the right) 
and (k@) (on the left) etc. 
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(vi) (d) ends with the second v-introd: symmetric to (v). 
) is a deduction o “) D obtained from (e) of ( 
‘) D and (d”) of ( “, C’) D by v-elim, where 
repetitions of C’ and C” respectively, Then (d)’ is 
’ v C’ and (d’) 
’ are made of 
(e)’ 
!A0 I- !Ca@ !C"O 
WI0 
!B’O, !P t- DO several tC !, 
!Ba, !C" I- Do or one 4?W! 
several eW! 
?B&, !B"O, !C@ I- Do 
!B”, !B”$ !C”@ !C"' t- Do 
(d")' 
! “y !c”o I- DO several 4-C !, 
!B ‘&, !C"O I- Do or one 4?W! 
!B", !B"O, !C" I- Do 
several eW! 
eo 
!A’, ! B&, !B” I- Do 
CUT. 
(viii) (d) is a deduction of (A)B+ C, obtained from a deduction (d’) of (A, B)C 
by =+introd, where is made of repetitions of B; then (d)’ is 
W’f 
! Ol-CQ 
!A’, !B” I- Co 
several &C ! or one 4fW! 
!A0 I- !B” - Co 
%-. 
(ix) (d) is a deduction of (ST, A’) B’ obtained from (d’) of (A’) B’ and (d’) of 
“) B’+ B” by *-elim; then (d)) is 
W” 
!A" I- B" 
!A" I- ! B” 
B! 
(d")O B”O I- B'd 
! ‘10 k !B’O --_o Bno !A ‘O f , .B" - B"O t- B"O 
c- 
!A 10, !A’& + Bid 
CUT. 
(x) (d) is a deduction of (A) B coming from a deduction of ( )O by the rule 
-elim (we have used the notation 0 for the absurdity of intuitionistic logic); then 
(d) O is 
W, 
(d) is a deduction of ( )vx B coming from a d4duction (d’) of ( 
-introd; then (6)’ is 
W, 
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(xii) (d) is a deduction of ( [?/xl coming fe~m a deduction (d’) of ( 
by the rule -elim; then (d)’ is 
CUT. 
(xiii) (d) is a deduction of ( )3x.B obtained from a deduction (d ‘) of ( 
by the rule Sintrod; then (n)” is 
(xiv) ((I) is a deduction of ( )D obtained from (e’) of ( )3x.C and (e”) of 





K! or one tW! 
emark. If we start with a deduction which is normal (in the strongest sense, 
involving commutative conversions), then the construction of (d)’ can be slightly 
modified, yielding a normal proof. 
Observe that our translation is faithful in the sense that if A0 is provable in linear 
logic, A is provable in intuitionistic logic. This can be easily justified as follows: 
Linear logic satisfies cut-elimination, hence a subformula property. A0 is written in 
the fragment 0, -0, 0, &, !, /\, V of li’near logic. In particular, writing the rules for 
this fragment with two-sided sequents we see that the proof of A0 uses only 
intuitionistic linear sequents. Now, if we erase all symbols !, and replace 
@,&?,A,V by v, A, +, V, 3, then we get a proof of A in intuitionistic logic. 
The translation just chosen has been historically spoken the first work on linear 
logic, dating back to the end of 1984 for disjunction, and October 1985 for the f'dl 
language. ‘The transiation is sound, not only for provability, but also w-t-t. the 
coherent semantics. Once more, this is the coherent semantics of intuitionisric iogic 
which suggested to put the hidden linear features o the front stage. Other transla- 
tions are possible, for instance one following the idea of sticking to open facts: 
A*= !A for A atomic, 
)* = !l\A*, 
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This boring translation is reminiscent of the modal translation of intuitionistic 
logic. This translation is not sound w.r.t. the coherent semantics and this is enough 
to show that its interest is limited. 
5.2. The translation of the system F 
F is nothing but a functional notation for second-order propositional natural 
deduction, so we can essentially apply the translation of Section 5.1. We concentrate 
here on the reduced version of F (variables, a, V), and we 
precise definition so that normal terms of F are directly 
proof-nets. 
make a slightly more 
translated as normal 
5.2.1. Types 
The types of F are translated as follows: 
a’= a when a is a variable, 
(S+ T)‘= !S” - To, (Va.T)‘= Aa.T! 
The translation has the substitution property: (S[ T/a])” = S”[ T”f a]. 
5.2.2. Translation of terms 
We distinguish two kinds of terms: 
(i) General terms of t[x]: x is a sequence of variables of types S, which are 
exactly the free variables of t which is of type T. Such a term will be translated into 
a proof-net to whose conclusions will be exactly !SoL and 7? 
(ii) Terms with a distinguished headvariable y: t[x, J] with x of type S, y of type 
H, 1 of type T. y is distinct from all variables in t. When we say that y is distinguished, 
this only means that we have decided to remark that We are in case (ii), instead of 
using the iiliGii5 g-p ti,a,id procedure case of (i). in that case, to has the conclusions 
Step 1: t = y (so that T = H); then to is 
‘To’ P! 
Step 2: t has a headvariable and may be written as u[y(u)/y’], where u[y’] is 
already a term with a headvariable. The other variables of u and u are rr and x’, 
some of them being common. Then we form the configuration shown in Fig. 49 (y 
- !U’ ~1101-- - 
!iJ’O gj U”O 
Fig. 49. 
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is of type U’=+ U” so that we must get a conclusion ! U”O UIdL). From this, by 
using the rule 
p$“’ ?q’OL 
ys;“’ ?C 
every time xi = xJ’, we obtain the interpretation to. 
Step3: thasa headvariable and may be written as u[u{ U’)f y’] for a certain 
term u[y’] (which already has a headvariable y’ of type U”[ V/a], y being of type 
/\ a. U”). We form the configuration in Fig. 50. 
( 
/ -\ 
/ UO I . 
r 
To k_ ?S" 1 4 - 
A a.U"O 1 
Fig. 50. 
Step 4: t has a headvariable, but we do not want to distinguish it any longer. 
Consider the term u[y, X] with a new distinguished headvariable such that t is 
U[Xi, x]; then form the configuration in Fig. 51. This will be to, except if Xi is equal 
to some variable nf _x, in which case one qust end with a contraction. .*.“I 




Note: All other steps are steps involving no terms with headvariables. 
Step 5: t is U(U); u is of type T’+ T”, v is of type T’: we now form the configuration 
in Fig. 52 to which we apply, if necessary, a certain number of contractions between 
?SiOL and ?.!$“I when xi = xy. 
) 
/ 
_ 1’ ?T'O 1 'jj T"O 
CUT 
Fig. 52. 
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Step 6: t is u{ U} with u of type Va.T’; the corresponding configuration is shown 
in Fig. 53. 
CUT 
Fig. 53. 
Step 7: t is hxu, with u, x of types T”, T’. Let x occurs in and 




TT-1 ‘8 T”O 
Fig. 54. 
Step 8: t is Va.u, with u of type T’, the configuration is given in Fig. 55. 
The steps must now be put togethel” to form a correct definition by induction of 
the translation ( )‘. The details are left to the reader, but, by correctly handling the 
case with headvariables, one translates a normal term of F into a cut-free proof-net 
of PN2. 
’ 0. 
Fig. 55. - 
5.2.3. Semantic soundness of the translation 
The coherent semantics of F has been given in [5]; we also have a coherent 
semantics for PN2 (Section 3); the semantic soundness of the translation is that 
t ‘* = t* if the symbol * denotes both semantic interpretations. 
(0 e first thing to check is t there is a semantic soundness of the translation 
es, namely that To* = T*. s easily follows from two remarks: 
(i) the type const is exactly the same thing as b,. 
(ii) semantically speakin 
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Roof: X* I’ is the set of traces of stable functions from X to Y This coherent 
space is defined by 
where Xfin is the set of all finite objects of X. 
(a,z)C(b,t)[modX=$Y] iff (l)aub~X+zGt[mod Y], 
(2)aubEX and a#b+z#t. 
Now, observe !X; we have ]!Xl = Xfi,; moreover, a=6 [mod !X] iff a v b E 
other terms, IX* Y] = I!Xl x I YI and 
(a, z)c(b, t) [mod X+ Y] iff (1) a=6 [mod !x]+ zCt [mod Y], 
(2) a-6 [mod !X]+ z-t [mod Y]. 
This clearly established that X+ Y = !X - Y (end ofproof). 
(2) The semantic soundness of the interpretation of term is based on the ideas 
already introduced in the pons asinorum (Section IV); checking all the cases here 
would be a pure loss of time. 
5.2.4. Syntactic soundness of the translation 
This is another issue, albeit of slightly less importance than the semantic soun 
The semantic soundness is enough to ensure that there is no loss of expressive power 
between F and PN2. (There is no essential gain either: the Normalization Theorem 
for PN2 can be carried out in PA*). However, a syntactic relation between normaliz- 
ation in F and PN2 would be welcome. In fact, when t =/ u in F, one can find a 
u’ such that to =) u’ in PN* and up differs from u” by a different order of use of the 
rules (C?). This problem is due to the fact that, in F (and systems based on 
h-abstraction), the identification of variables is indeed made just before the abstrac- 
tion, while PN2 is more refined and gives a specific order for the identification. This 
is a quality of PN2: a proof-net of PN2 contains additional information which the 
theory usually ignores (the order of the contractions), but which is very relevant in 
practice (e.g., for retaining the substitution as long as possible) and so traditionally 
belongs to the sphere of ‘bricokzge’ (i.e., handicrait). 
The verification of the syntactic soundness of the translation is boring and without 
surprise. 
5.3. Translation of current data in PN2 
Since we know that current data types can be translated in F and that F translates 
in PN2, we can, by transitivity, translate integers, oleans, trees, lists, etc. into 
PN2. However, PN2 has subtler handling of the ty 
translation, not transiting t 
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ooleans 
eslf is to choose the definition , with 
TRUE = 10, FALSE= 20. 
The instruction IF p THEN p' ELSE p" is defined by the configuration in Fig. 56, 
where /3 and p’ have the same conclusions C It is immediate that IF TRUE THEN 
p' ELSE' p"=/p' and IF FALSE THEN p' ELSE fl"=/B". There are however two 
strategies possible for normalizing such instructions. 
(i) The lazy strategy consists in not using the commutative conversions (&-CC). 
CUT 
Fig. 56. 
The IF-'THEN-ELSE instruction is viewed as a sealed box from the viewpoint of p’ 
and /Y’. The only way to get the box opened is to wait until the main door is opened 
(cut on TRUE or FALSE). This strategy is particularly interesting in the case we are 
normalizing a procf-net whose conclusions involve neither 0 nor V since we are 
sure that all such boxes will eventually be opened by the main door. In terms of 
parallelism, such a box can be viewed as a moment when one has to wait (the 
communication through C is temporarily interrupted) (and maybe this waiting time 
can be used to do other tasks). 
(ii) The generalstrategy consists in entering the boxes even by the auxiliary doors; 
this causes a duplication of certain tasks, with the unpleasant feature that if the 
main door is eventually opened, half of what has been done may be erased. Sut if 
we have indications that the main door may never open, this strategy may be of 
some use. 
5.3.2. Iniegers 
s are translated as Va.a + (a * a) =+ a. The straightforward translation 
2 would yield three “!“s, including a nested one! It turns out that, 
ng the three implications used in this type, the first two can be taken as linear. 
therefore define - a)Gw). Equivalently, in 
A a.a - (!(a-a)-a), and t c to /ja.!(a-a)-((a-a). For 
ce, the nulmber “3” can be represented in F (natural deduction) as shown in 
g. 57(a). 1x1 W+C2, the representation of “3” looks as shown in Fig. 57(b). 
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a *((a *I =@a) 
VI 
Va.a +((a =?a) *a) 
Fig. 57(a). The number “3” represented in the system F (natural deduction). 
?(a PP al) IB a 
?(a m al) a 
a1 ‘9 (?(a PD al, lg a) 
A 
1 a.(a 1 B (?(a m a 1 3 al 
Fig. 57(b). The number “3” represented in PM. 
The functionsri zlotation for “3” in F is Va.hx”.hy”*“.y(y(a))). There are other 
possible representations of “3” in PN2: before the first V-rule, we can use a different 
combination of the rules (C ?) and maybe some rules ( W?). 
Consider all possible proof-nets with int as conclusion; the end is necessarily as 
in the described example a A-box, then a V-link whose premises are aL and 
?( a 0 aA) ?? a, which in turn follows from a Wink applied to a and ?( a 0 a’). NOW, 
there are several possibilities: this ?( a @ a’) may arise by several combinations of 
( W?), (C?), and (D?). Above the combination of these rules there are several 
premises a @ al, and above them premises a, al. e premises are 
by axiom-links, and are also linked to the for s a and al m 
earlier. The only possible configuration, in terms of proof-nets is the one shown in 
Fig. 58 and the number of axiom-links deter 
of: n + 1 axiom-links are needed to represent 
four axio 
picture (with extra ( ?), difierznt order for the rules ( C ?)) would yie7,d a term 
with the same semantics. 
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al ?- a Li-- -a 51 -a 51 
-m -pD . . . . -e---o 
. 
Fig. 58. 
Let us explain the interpretation of the proof-net “3”; for this, the best is to return 
to the pans asinorum (Section IV). Specify a coherent space X in order to interpret 
a in the inner part of the box. Now, XL T!?(?(XOXL) 2? X) means 
x-(!X-X) - X), and should be viewed as the set of all linear maps from X 
to !(X - X) - X. Then, !(X - X) - X is (X - X)*X and should be seen as 
the set of all stable maps from X - X to X. Summing up, what is inside the box 
describes, for a = X, a binary stable function mapping X, X - X into X, and linear 
in the first argument. This function is defined by F( x, f ) = f(f(f( x))), as the semantic 
computation easily shows. More generally, all proof-nets which represent n are 
semantically identical: on X, they correspond to the function F(q,f) =f”(x). 
This is very close to the more familiar representation of integers in F; the main 
difference is that the argument f is linear. It is possible to stick to ‘f linear’ because 
f * is still linear. But the function associating _F” with f is never linear, but for n = 1. 
Now, look at Fig. 59; the diagram represents the successor function, which linearly 
I 
-- 
!(a + a) 1 a 




?(a m al 
I 




(a --o (a -0 a) (a -o a) =) a 
9 
a -0 ((a.4 a) *a) 
int 1 -int 
'g 
int -0 int 
Fig. 59. 
t; if one applies SUCL to a repressentation fi of the integer n, by 
figuration in Fig. 60, then, after normalization, one gets a representa- 
tion n + 1 of the next integer. 
int 
l \ 
\ succ I \ 1 int ‘1 .int - - 
int 4 ist’ (int 4 int}l 
’ k. 
- - - 
CUT 
Fig. 60. 
REC(P, @‘) with the conclusion i 
A and A - A should be the unique conclu of /3 or p’; arbitrary other co 
elusions are welcome in p and additional ?-conclusions can be accepted in p’.) 
(!(A -o A) -0 A)1 
e 




int -o A 
Fig. 61. 
When we apply REC(@, p’) to fi, by the configuration in Fig. 62(a), this reduces 
to the configuration in Fig. 62(b) (n occurrences of p’; this proof-net is “p’ applied 











’ int -o A (int 4 A) 1 
CUT 
Fig. 62(a). 
. . . 
A-oA . . . 
CUT CUT CUT A 
Fig. 62(b). “J?’ applied n times to p”. 
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The problem is that, in practice, WC do not necessarily have linear functions to 
start with when making recursion. However, what about a recursion with p as a 
proof of A, /3’ as a proof of A+A, i.e., . VA --Q A? This can be reduced to the previous 
case: from the configuration in Kg. 63 (here, auxiliary conclusions can be accepted 
?d CUT A 
1 ?A _ !A 
JP 
!A -o !A 
Fig. 63. 
too, but only of the ?-form). Then, what we want can be expressed by derelicting 
EC( y, y’) as shown in Fig. 64. 
Fig. 64. 
. (i) Show the existence of a proof-net whose conclusion is int -0 !int and 
such that when applied to an integer ii, it yields !n’; i.e., it is put into a !-box. 
(ii) Conclude that the same functions from N to RI are representable in PN2 as 
t and of type ii 
53.3. Lists, trees 
e can tahe more or less the usual translations while being careful to use linear 
ications everytime * is not actually needed. The details would be too much here. 
Interpretation of classical ogic 
e ii-translation of el, which reduces the problem to 
the one alread in Section 5.1. owever, the Tl-translation has a terrible 
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defect, namely using intuitionistic negation which is the only citicizable intuitionistic 
connective. But Giidel’s translation is still working if, instead of llA, one uses 
((A*F)*F) where F is any formula which is not provable. Mere we shall use I 
for F. Formulas of the form (( A=~L)*L.) are equivalent to ?!A; i.e., in topolinear 
terms, they are closed facts, equal to the closure of their interior. Let us call a fact 
regular when it is equal to the closure of its interior, i.e., to the closure of some 
closed fact. We have the following properties. 
(i) If A is regular, then ?( A’-) is regular. 
(ii) If A and B are regular, then A 38 B is regular: A 38 B = ?!A ?!? ! B = ?( !A@ ! B) 
where !A@ !B is open. 
From this, the principles of the translation are immediate: 
A+= ?!A when A is atomic 
(Av B)+=A+‘8 B+, (lA)+ = ?(A+l), (WxA)‘= ?!Ax.A+. 
The interpretation of classical disjunction is particularly simple. This justifies our 
claim that par is the constructive contents of classical disjunction. 
Now, the regular subsets of a topalinear space form a complete boolean algebra 
and from this, it will be possible to justify all classical laws translated by ( )‘. In 
particular, to some extent, we get a se:nantics of proofs for classical logic. But the 
translation used lacks the purity obtained in the intuitionistic case. This is due to 
the fact that the equivalence ?!A+- A+ is used too often. 
5.5. Translation of cut-free classical ogic 
Jf we turn our attention towards cut-free classical logic, the situation changes 
radically, in the sense that a convincing interpretation inside linear logic is possible. 
The interpretation is based on the familiar three-valued idea of giving independent 
meanings to positive and negative occurrences of formulas (see [3]). 
By induction on the formula A, we define pA and nA: 
pA = nA = A when A is atomic 
p 1 A = (nA)‘, nlA=(pA)‘, 
pAv B=(pA)@(pB), ‘nA v 
pAh B=?(pA)@?(pB) 9 nAA B=(nA)&(n 
pA+B=(nA)%(pB), +B=?(pA)-+!(n 
XA = l\x.?( PA), , 
p3xA = vx.pA, 
e reader will toy a little wit is defi~itiom is 
on strong symmetries, unlike the less satisfactory translation in Section 5.4. In fact, 
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the situation is the same between the very good translation ( )’ and the less satisfac- 
tory translation ( )*, both considered in Section 5.1. But here we have to give up 
the cut-rule. 
Now, with each proof in cut 6lassical ogic of a sequent one associates 
a proof of the sequent !nA I- in linear logic in a more or less straightforward 
way. This paper has already been too long, and a reader not already dead at this 
point will have no trouble in finding out the details. In particular, due the cut- 
elimination theorem, there is a very nice and natural semantics of proofs offull classical 
logic. 
The cut-rule has a very ambiguous status: it can be seen as the general scheme: 
?pA - !nA, i.e., n(A*A). This scheme, although wrong, is conservative over 
sequents of the form !nB F ?pC, i.e., over formulas of the form ?pA, whose main 
feature seems to be the absence of “!“. 
onjecture and question. It should be possible to find a formulation of cut-elimina- 
tion as a general conservativity result over a fragment of linear logic, e.g., the 
fragment free from !. The cut-elimination procedure would appear as the effective 
way of eliminating the conservative principles (which should be the formulas 
n(A+A) or something more general). Such a program, if properly carried out, would 
give a full constructive content to classical iogic. 
5.6. The Approximation Theorem 
In the introduction we have already mentioned that linear logic was able to control 
the length of disjunctions in Kerbrand’s theorem. Let us now use what we know, 
in particular, the translation of classical logic just given. To simplify the matter, we 
shall work with a prenex formula 3xVy3zVt Rxyzt with R quantifier-free. The 
p-translation of such a formula is VxAy?VzAt ?Sxyzt with S quantifier-free and 
!-free. 
Now, if our formula is provable in classical logic, the ? of its p-translation, i.e., 
?VxAy?VzAt ?Sxyzt will be provable in linear logic. 
Now, consider the connectives ?n defined by 
?,A = (_L@A) 79 (IOA) 78 l l 0 ‘I& (_k.@ A) (n times). 
The Approximation Theorem (see below) says that we can replace each ? by 
approximants ?, ; in particular, ?,,VxAy?,,JzA t ?Sxyzt (in the quantifier-free part, 
we have kept ?). This formula clearly expresses that we had a midsequent with at 
most n 0 m formulas or, equivalently, a Herbrand disjunction of length at most ~1. m. 
It also says something about the intimate structure of this Merbrand disjunction 
(the n and the m). 
s how linear logic c be used to control the length 
brand disjunctions. roximation theorem 
about is just the matF.matieal contents of’ our slo an: usudl! logic 
near logic (without mildalities) b_y n passage to limit. 
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5.1. efinition (upproximants). The connectives ! and ? are approximated by the 
connect ives ! n and ?, (n f 0): 
!,A=(I&A)@- . .@(I &A) (n times), 
?m4 = (a@A) 38. . . 79 (-MA) (n times). 
eorern (Approximation Theorem). Let A be a theorem of linear logic; with 
each occurrence of ! in A, assign an integer Z 0; then it is possible to assign integers 
# 0 to all occurrences of ? in such a way that if B denotes the result of replacing each 
occurrence of ! (respectively ?) by !, (respectively ?‘,) where n is the integer assigned 
to it, then B is still a theorem of linear logic. 
Proof. One can formulate the exact analogue for a sequent t-A and we prove the 
result by induction on a cut-free proof of I-A in linear sequent calculus. We content 
ourselves with a few interesting cases: 
(i) One can assume that the axioms t-A, A’ are restricted to the atomic case 
and so, no problem. 
(ii) If the last rule is (!): from I-A, ?B infer I- !A, ? then we already obtained 
kA’, ? $3’ (approximation A’ of A, 2 of B, and a sequence n). Now, one easily gets 
F- 1, ?,B’ and so, 1-18~ A’, ?,B’. Let k be the integer associated with the first ! in !A; 
we get I- !kA’, ?J?‘. 
(iii) If the last rule is (D?): from I- ?A, ?A, B infer t- ?A, B and if we have already 
approximations I- ?3A’, ?*A”, B, we can first ensure A’ = A” by increasing the respec- 
tive ?-assignments. Then let A”’ be the result; we then form I- ?,+,A”‘, 
(iv) If the last rule is (&): from I-A, C and t--B, C infer I-A & B9 Cz then we have 
approximants t-A’, C’ and kB’, C”; by increasing the ?-assignments in C’ and C’, 
we get C”’ and I-A’ & B’, C”’ is still provable. 
(v) We have gone through the main steps: The rule (D?) would involve a ?I 
and the rule ( W?) a ?* (which we have excluded, so a ?1, too). 
The crucial fact that one can always replace ?, by ?, when pa c m is more or less 
immediate. In a similar way, !‘,, can be replaced by !, when n C m. iI3 
6. Work in progress: slices 
There are several directions of work in progress, e.g., the theory of totality (solved 
by saying that an element of a coherent space X is total with the phase p), which 
have not reached maturity and which have therefore been omitted fro 
which is already a bit long. I-Iowever, the presentation of slices ha 
decided, for two reasons: 
(i) this is the only immediate approach we now tc the boring standardization 
theorem; 
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(ii) it presents the absolute limit for a parallelization of the syntax, i.e., the 
removal of all boxes but !-ones. 
The present stage of the theory is a list of definitions with 110 theorem. . . . 
A s&e is a proof-structure making use of (1) all links and axioms 
already introduced, (2) !-boxes (the contents of such boxes are sets of slices all 









2. nition. The slicing of a proof-net /3 is a nonempty set of slices with the 
same conclusions as p. 
(1) Slicing of a box: the !-box built from p slices into the set consisting of just 
one !-box; the contents of this box is the slicing of @. Boxes as shown in Fig. 65(a) 
slice into the disconnected structures of Fig. 65(b), where the pi’s arc the slices of 
Fig. 65(a). 
q 
\ A’ 1 
Fig. 65(b). 
(I 'i 
PO A box of the type shown in Fig. 66(a) slices into 
where the pi’s and &‘s are the respective slices of p 
-c -A&B- 
Fig. 66(a). Fig. 66(b). 
A&B 
the structures of Fig. 66(b), 
and p’. Finally, a box as in 
I.84 - 2& 
A&B 
Fig. 67(a) slices into the structures of Fig. 67(b) where the pi’s are the slices of p= 
(seen as a box) slices into the disconnected structure T 
f-net 
P( 
built from boxes ilg, %. . . , If%,, by means of links, say 
of 
e slices of /3 are all /3(/Q,. . . , pj;) for all slices p+, I l l , /3; 
respectively. 
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Fig. 67(a). Fig. 67(b). 
. (i) The slicing is the ‘development’ of a proof-net by 
Each slice is in itself logically incorrect, but it is expected that the total family of 
slices has a logical meaning. However, there is no characterization of sets of slices 
which are the slices of a proof-net. Moreover, we do not even know whether or not 
identifying proof-nets with the same slices could lead to logical atrocities; for 
instance, is it possible to define the coherent semantics of a set of slices? 
? 
(ii) The slicing does not work for !-boxes; this is because the modalities ! and 
are the only nonlinear operations of linear logic. However, if we were working 
with ! as an infinite tensorization 818~ /li, then it would be possible to slice, but 
we would get a nondenumerable family of slices! A more reasonable approach 
would be to make finite developments based on !A = (1 & A)@ !A so that we never 
go to the ultimate, nondenumerable slicing, but generate it continuously. This idea 
is of interest because it could serve, without changing anything essential to PN2, 
for expressing nonterminating processes. 
(iii) We shall now try to define the normalization procedure on the slices directly; 
however, the rule (T-CC), which involves the erasing of a ghost-box, is di 
handle in those terms and this rule is therefore not considered in what we are doing. 
Strictly speaking, we shall get a proof of standardization without this rule, but there 
is so little to add to take care of this rule . . . . The fact that we are forced to make 
‘bricolage’ on such details is an illustration of the difficulties that arise from the 
absence of a real understanding of slices. 
6.4. Definition (contraction of a slice). A slice /3 contracts into a set p’ of slices 
(very often consisting of one slice) as follows: 
(1) (A): Axiom-contraction, like (AC). 
(2) (l&/l@): Replace a configuration as in Fig. 68(a) by the one in Fig. 6f-W). 
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(4) (l&/2@): If in p a configuration occurs as in Fig. 69, then p co 






(2&/l@): Symmetric to (4). 
(01 ): As (O/-SC). 
/I) a configuration 
1 
CUT1 (no premises above 1 or I) 




- IC J 1 ?C 
CUT 
Fig. 70. 
(8) ( !/ W?) a configuration as in Fig. 70 (no premise above 2C) is replaced by 
(9) (!/D?): 
slices pi (with 
Fig. 71(b). 
If /3 contains the configuration as in Fig. 71(a) and X is made of 
conclusions ? A), then p contracts to the set made of the slices in 
4 
CUT 
(10) (i/G?): As (!/C?-SC). 
(11) (/j/V): If in p occurs 
D? 
Fig. 71. 
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then one contracts it by replacing 
pattern by the cut 
everywhere, and then by re 
(12) ( !): Adaptation of ( !-CC) to slices, details omitted. 
(Church- Rosser property). Using Definition 6.4, one gets a notion of 
reduction for sets of slices. This concept is Church-Rosser, as one can easily check. 
emark (standardization property). If, in the definition of contraction, we 
restrict cases (3) and (4) to the case where p cannot be normalized further, and 
case (8) to the case where the elements of X cannot be normalized further, we 
obtain the notion of standard contraction from which we derive the notion of 
standard reduction. The standardization property says that if a set of siices has a 
standard normalization into a set of slices which cannot be normalized further, then 
all normalization sequences tarting from it are finite. This is easy to prove from 
the Church-Rosser property and the fact that the erasure is well-controlled in the 
standard case. 
(standardization of proof-nets). If p =/ p’, then sl(p) =/ sl(p’), where 
sl( .) stands for the slicing (provided (T-CC) has not been used). This lies in the 
fact that the commutation rules (&-CC), ( -CC), (WC), ( W?-CC) do nothing on 
the slicings. Now, this fact can easily be used to transfer standardization to proof-nets. 
One must work a little more to consider (T-CC) but there are no real problems. 
V. Two years of linear logic: selection fro 
This short historical note is here to explain the successive states of linear logic 
and, in particular, to mention possibilities that have been discrrded for reasons that 
may seem excessive to further researchers. 
V. 1. The jirst glimpses 
Linear logic first appeared after the author had been challenged by 
Curien to extend the coherent semantics (at that time: qualitative se 
sum of types, their claim being that it was necessary 
that are typical for Scott domains. The answer is 
and (except for the notations which are absent), 
the decomposition of the type 
t er was 
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type sum, including so-called ‘commutative rules’; commutative rules were inter- 
preted by remarking that eliminations were linear in their main premise and so, it 
was sufficient to ‘linearize’ the treatment of the sum. By the way, observe that the 
claim that ‘eliminations are linear’ sound deliciously o olete now since, by the 
existence of the involutive nil, there is no real distinction tween introduction and 
elimination! 
V.2. The quantitative attempt 
After this isolated remark, nothing happened before ctober 1985; the subject 
came back to life during a working session in Torino. At that moment, the quantitative 
semantics was considered by the author as more promising because more weird. 
The quantitative semantics was showing the decomposition in a very conspicuous 
way, e.g., A+ B = Int( A).& suggesting to consider separately Int and . , i.e., ‘of 
course’ and ‘entails’. The decompositions in the case of qualitative domains (coherent 
spaces) were less obvious. 
The first formalism for linear logic was therefore a functional language essentially 
based on - ) !, 0, 0, and second-order quantification, in which it was possible to 
make arbitrary sums (superpositions) of terms of the same type and in particular 
the void sum 0 of any type. Commutation rules of the sum with formation schemes 
expressed the linearity of everything but !-introduction and terms could be normal- 
ized as sums of primitive ones. This decomposition in sum has been given up when 
moving to the coherent semantics, though it was a very nice feature of the calculus. 
In particular, it was possible to decompose a term t as to+ tl, with to the normal 
part of t, tl the part still to be executed. Also, at that time, it was possible to write 
an equation of the style !A = 1+ A.!A and to treat normalization as a process of 
Taylor expansion (this formula being reminiscent of f(dx) =f(O) + dx.f’(O), some- 
thing like that . . .). This approach had the clear advantage of making the execution 
of a program never end, except in trivial cases, and this is an aspect of parallelism 
that has been (perhaps temporarily) lost in the formalism we have chosen in this 
reference version. This approach was g;i:en up because of the lack of any logical 
justification, i.e., because it was not a proof-system. For instance, the system was 
not making any difference between 0 and &, or accepted void terms. The coherent 
semantics was then introduced more and more seriously, and the logical approach 
became more prominent. 
V3. ?7re htuitionistic attempt 
As the logical framework was clarifying itself, the lation remained strictly 
intuitionistic; at that moment I made attempts (wit ascari) to work out an 
lementation of Ii uent calculus; although the alism was intuitionistic, 
ommunication between sequents tayed furiously sy etric. From this moment 
on (January 1986), the following things appeared: 
_ the well-hidden connectives nil, par, why-not; 
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- the coherent semantics (restriction to binary qualitative dor.,ains to get an invoiu- 
tive negation) in its definite version; 
_ the first attempt for proof-nets. 
If there are features of the quantitative attempt hat we mourn, tfren the giving 
up of the intuitionistic framework is apparently completely positive. The only 
inconvenience is the abandonment of the functional notation which is so easy to 
understand; but, ‘il faut souffrir pour he belle’. 
VA. Recent developments 
One of the most irritating questions was the question of totality: in two words, 
not every element of a coherent space is noble; e.g., most of the time, we like to 
exclude the empty set from the possible semantics of our terms. For this we have 
to speak of total elements, which look like the potential proofs of their type; in [5], 
the situation has been clarified, but in an intuitioi;latic framework. The newly 
discovered ‘classical’ features of linear logic made it very complicated because one 
would have necessarily arrived at something like: ‘given two types which are linear 
negations of one another, one of the types is empty (nothing total) while the other 
is full (everything is total)‘. The solution found in April ‘86 was ‘totality with phases’ 
and led to the Tarskian semantics of phases of August ‘86. Before the phase semantics, 
several others were tried, without complete success, and, for instance, a functional 
interpretation of the classical case within the intuitionistic one (with the advantage 
of getting rid of problems of totality) was worked out and then dumped. 
Another difficult question was the way to formulate proofs: sequent calculus was 
appropriate, but since there is no nice normalization in sequent caiculus, we got 
into trouble. This is the reason why, before July ‘86, when the fundamental results 
on proof-nets were obtained, the following interesting solution was considered: 
compute directly with the semantics. The only thing one has to be sure of is that 
the objects we look for are finite enough and this offers no essential dilEculty. Even 
now, this approach retains part of its attraction. 
A rule was under discussion for a while, namely the rule of MIX, which can be 
formulated as . 
t-A t--B 
r-A,B l 
The rule says that C@ D - C ?i? 0, which seems nattiral, and can be derived from 
I -0 UU. Its adjunction would not change linear logic too much, however, there 
was a negative feeling about the rule, essentially the idea that t-A, B means that A 
and B do communicate. The situation was clarified after the phase semantics 
appeared: semantically speaking, MIX is the requirement hat I is closed under 
product. There is no clear reason to require this (without requiring 1 E I, which 
would be a bit too much) and MIX is now no longer under serious discussion. One 
of the arguments for IX is that, without it, the type of communication considered 
loo AX Girard 
in proof-nets is very totalitarian: everything communicates with everything, while 
MIX could accept more liberal solutions, typically two non-interconnected proof- 
nets etc. However, what we said is true as long as 1 is not used in proof-nets since 
it is only for formal reasons that L can communicate upwards. In particular, two 
separate proof-nets B and /3’ can be put together by using I, the only price to pay 
being that another conclu:.ion (I@ 1) has been added. 
But what has been und!y:r discussion most and has still not been clarified is the 
exact formalism for ! (and ?). The question is of great interest because behind it, 
the implementation of beta-conversion lies; we devote the rest of this note to give 
a panorama of the main lines that have been considered. 
VS. 7%e exponentids 
Already in the well-known case of lambda-calculus, there are two traditions: 
_ the tradition of identifying the variables, which comes from beta-conversion, when 
swe substitute u for all occurrences of X; 
_ the tradition coming from the implementation, which tries to repress or control 
substitution. 
The first tradition rests on safe logical grounds, whereas the second one is a kind 
of bricolage with hazardous justifications. 
In the first tradition, a term t[x, y] will by identification yield the term t[x, X] 
which would have also resulted from the consideration of t[y, x]. This is why the 
modelling of beta-conversion uses spaces of finite coherent sets (which can be seen 
in the definition of !X): we use a space of repetitions, but we make identifications 
between (x, y) and (y, x), After many hesitations, we have eventually chosen this 
definit’ In, but it is far from being perfect: 
(I) Nowhere has it been said that we should model the implicative types by plain 
graphs (which is done with this solution). On the other hand, modelling more subtle 
distinctions (for instance, distinguishing between the function coming from t[x, y] 
and the one coming from t[y, x]) would give a more serious basis to the second 
tradition. 
(2) The consideration of the space of sets has a bad consequence on the formal 
behaviour of our semantics: functorially speakin g, we lose preservation of kernels, 
which seems to indicate that a theoretical mistake has been made. 
Besides the variant retained in this reference paper, several others have been 
considered to remedy criticisms (1) and (2): 
(i) As long as linear logic was resting on quantitative ideas, the principle 
(inspired on the way Krivine handled beta-conversion by restricting substitution tq 
headvariables, and on the fact that a term is linear in its headvariable) suggested 
to use a linear ‘first-order development’, based on the identification between !A and 
e operaticns of identification could be seen as formal derivation or 
e interest of this approach was to propose, at the theoretical 
al beta-conversion by iterated linear conversions. 
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(ii) When the quantitative approach turned out to be insufficient, the author 
tried to preserve this idea by means of !A - 1& A@ !A. Unfortunately, this principle 
is not enough to justify contraction, even if written in a form inspired on inductive 
definitions (projective definitions). From this attempt a variant remained, due to 
Lafont, where !A was defined as a projective definition, and satisfies ?A- 
I& A & ( !A@ !A); This idea ca~b he modelled in terms of coherent spaces and leads 
to considering certain trees instead of sets. 
(iii) Another possibility seriously considered is the infinitary approach: !A = 
@( 1 Rc A), the tensorization being made on o copies. Here we get quite a nice 
theory, but we have to take care of the heavy apparatus of infinite proof-nets. For 
implementation we also have to restore a finitary calculus, i.e., to do some bricolage 
again. Here the semantics involves finite sequences with holes, e.g., (x, 9 x3, x,).~ 
The last two variants model what we have called the second tradition; i.e., they 
model strategies of progressive substitutions. Also, they are free from the defect we 
have mentioned w.r.t. kernels. However, 
(3) . the isomorphism !(A & B) - !A@!B is no longer valid (it would be valid if 
we were considering multisets instead of sets); 
(4) both variants do not succeed in catching the idea of first-order development. 
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